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given rise to a narrow knowledge base and a sticky pattern of specialization.
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vulnerability to the financial and currency crisis.
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7The Issue
Korea has been highly successful in its approach to industrialization: within three
decades a resource-poor and relatively small country at the periphery of the world
economy has become a leading exporter of manufactures; of all developing
countries, Korea has experienced the most rapid expansion and transformation of its
manufacturing sector; and a critical feature of the Korean model of late
industrialization has been its focus on learning and capability formation (Kim Linsu
1997a). These achievements are real and very impressive.
Then, seemingly out of the blue, crisis hit: Korea´s currency tumbles, asset prices
are collapsing, financial and corporate insolvency are spreading, and economic
growth has been drastically reduced. There is a real danger that stagnation may last
for a couple of years and that this may well destroy earlier achievements and
accumulated capabilities. What went wrong with the Korean model?  How is it
possible that a country that has succeeded to establish a broad industrial base at
record speed, remains vulnerable to the vicissitudes of international finance and
currency markets? Does this imply that the Korean model of late industrialization
has failed, that industrial policies have to be discarded and that a convergence to the
Anglo-American model of capitalism is the only option left?1
The answer to these questions depends on how one explains the current crisis; of
equal importance is how one defines the Korean model. A popular explanation of
the crisis is that Korea´s real problem lies with banks and their regulation and has
little to do with the real economy2 ; others highlight the catalytic role played by the
uncontrolled globalization of capital markets and the deflationary risks of the IMF´s
rescue package3. Such explanations only provide an incomplete picture. There is no
                                                
1
 See, for instance, Roberts, P.C., “The Asian Crisis Proves Industrial Policy Doesn´t Pay”, Business
Week, December 22, 1997, p.12. For a critique of such claims, see Chang Ha Joon (1998a and
1998b). The limits of convergence theory are discussed in Boyer, 1986 and other contributions in
Berger and Dore (1996); and in Ernst and Ravenhill 1997.
2
 See for instance Krugman, 1998.   For an earlier systematic analysis of such mechanisms in the case
of Korea, see Kim Pyung Joo, 1994 and R.Z. Aliber, 1994.
3
 For an analysis of how the international financial system has acted as a catalyst for Asia´s current
crisis, see Jomo, K.S., 1998. See also “Asia in Crisis. Financial Times Special Report”, Financial
Times, January 12-18, 1998. For a critique of the IMF approach, see Sachs (1997), Stiglitz (1997),
and Veneroso and Wade (1998).
8doubt that problems in Korea´s political economy have been closely interacting with
financial factors in the making of the crisis.
A novel contribution of this paper is its analysis of some inherent limitations of the
Korean model of late industrialization4. The focus is on the role of technological
learning for the development of Korea´s electronics industry5. I argue that the
Korean model that was tremendously successful during the catching-up phase, has
now reached its limits for two reasons: it generates unsustainable high debt-equity
ratios, and it is out of touch with current industrial upgrading requirements6. This
implies that attempts to return to the status quo ante will not provide a solution; nor
will the IMF approach with its focus on deregulation. While drastic changes in the
financial system are important, they need to be supplemented with changes in the
real economy: industrial upgrading is overdue, and this requires fundamental
changes in the Korean model. This does not imply a weakening of the coordinating
function of the state. Overcoming the barriers to industrial upgrading instead
necessitates a redefinition and strengthening of policies and institutions that can
provide the incentives and externalities that are necessary for technological
learning7. The result is that national policy interventions are required that can
compensate for these market failures. In addition to the subsidies and tax incentives,
suggested by Arrow, this also implies a variety of organizational and institutional
innovations in the implementation of government policies. A growing body of
research on economic policy-making in advanced industrial countries has
demonstrated that choice is possible, in terms of institutions and policy instruments,
and that this applies to macro-economic policy-making as well as to industrial and
                                                
4
 My understanding of Korea has been shaped by numerous interviews that I have conducted in this
country over the last two decades. I have also learnt a great deal from the writings of Kim Linsu,
one of the most thoughtful observers of Korean development, and a number of ( mostly Korean)
authors that I have mentioned in the bibliography. Important sources on the Korean model include
Johnson (1987), Amsden (1989), Wade (1990), Haggard (1990), Kim Linsu (1992 and 1997),
Evans ( 1995), and Chang Ha-Joon ( 1994, 1998a, and 1998b).
5
 The development of Korea´s electronics industry arguably has been the most impressive example of
its successful late industrialization.
6
 For earlier versions of this argument, see Ernst and O`Connor, 1989 and 1992; and Ernst, 1994b
7
 Markets are notoriously weak in generating technological learning. They are subject to
externalities: investments in capabilities are typically characterized by a gap between private and
social rates of return( Arrow, 1962).
9technology policies8. The same is true for developing countries. The real question
then is no longer whether national policies can make a difference, but rather: What
kind of policies and institutions are most conducive for improving local
competitiveness?
The analysis is centered on four basic limitations of the Korean model that result
from a symbiotic relationship between governments and large business groups (the
chaebol): i) a heavy reliance on credit and ii) an extremely unbalanced industry
structure have given rise to iii) a narrow knowledge base, and iv) a sticky pattern of
specialization. Catching-up has focused on capacity and international market share
expansion for homogeneous, mass-produced products; very little upgrading has
occurred into higher-end and rapidly growing market segments for differentiated
products and services. It is argued that such truncated upgrading is one important
reason for Korea´s vulnerability to the financial and currency crisis.
The argument is developed in three steps: In part I, I present key features of the
Korean approach to technological learning that were conducive for rapid catching-
up. Part II addresses some major weaknesses. I review evidence on two indicators of
truncated industrial upgrading: sticky specialization, and a narrow domestic
knowledge base. I then discuss the role of two explanatory factors: Korea´s high-
debt growth model and its unbalanced industry structure. In both parts, I use a
comparison with Japan and Taiwan in order to highlight some peculiar features of
the Korean way of technological learning. Finally, in the last part, I deal with the
options for strategic response: I describe some new competitive challenges that
Korea´s electronics industry is facing today and demonstrate why Korea can no
longer afford to muddle through in a state of truncated upgrading. I then sketch out
one possible option for strategic response to the current crisis: an upgrading from
product to technology diversification that broadens Korea´s knowledge base, but at
the same time utilizes its traditional strengths. I conclude with a brief discussion of
changes that are necessary in order to remove the barriers to industrial upgrading.
                                                
8
 For macroeconomic policies, see Frieden, 1991 and Fraenkel, Phillips and Chinn, 1992. For
industrial and technology policies, see Berger and Dore (eds.), 1996.
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I. Catching-Up in Electronics: Key Features of the Korean
Approach to Technological Learning
I.1. Achievements
Korea´s performance in the electronics industry has been truly remarkable: from a
meager $ 89 million in 1971, Korea´s electronics exports grew to $21.5 billion in
1996 (EIAK, July 1997); electronics is the country´s leading export industry; and
Korean electronics firms have developed strong positions in a number of important
international markets. They are the second largest supplier, behind Japanese firms,
for a broad range of consumer devices, from audio equipment to CTVs, VCRs and
microwave ovens, and for related key components (such as picture tubes) that
require precision engineering. Korean firms also excel as leading suppliers of
computer monitors and have recently developed a strong position in display
technology9.
Probably the most impressive achievement has been their meteoric rise in
DRAMs10: within less than a decade, the three main Korean producers, Samsung ,
Goldstar ( now LG) and Hyundai succeeded in eroding the once overwhelming
dominance of Japanese producers11. Between 1988 and 1992, Korea´s market share
for DRAMs increased from 7.5% to 17.7% in the U.S., from less than 7.8 % to
18.1% in Europe, and from 23.6% to 33.7% in Asia, exclusive of Japan12 Today,
Korea firms control roughly one third of the global market for DRAMs, well ahead
of the 20% market share of American companies and large enough to induce a sea
                                                
9
   Asia IT Report, “South Korea´s Monitor Industry in 1996”, Market Intelligence Center, Institute
for Information Industry, Taipei, September 1997. See also Linden et al (1997).
10
 DRAMs (= Dynamic Random Access Memories) constitute the largest market segment for
computer memories and make up roughly 24% of the world´s total semiconductor demand
(Dataquest, 1996)
11
 Intel and other American firms like Texas Instruments and Motorola had originally created the
DRAM market. However by around 1986, five major Japanese firms NEC, Toshiba, Hitachi,
Fujitsu, and Mitsubishi) had taken over and  had established a tight oligopoly that controlled
roughly two third of the world market for DRAMs (Ernst and O´Connor, 1992, chapter II).
Today, their share has fallen to below 48%, and this is primarily due to the successful market
penetration by Korean firms..
12
 Figures are courtesy of Dataquest, San JosÈ, California.
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change in industry structure: the three Korean majors have now have become
accepted members of the global oligopoly in this important market segment13.
This success has been due to a single-minded dedication to the requirements of
catching-up. How have Korean electronics firms developed their technological
capabilities in the context of export-led industrialization, and what explains the
speed of catching-up? A comparative perspective can help us to highlight some of
the peculiar features of the Korean case: where appropriate, I will use a comparison
with earlier developments in Japan and with some distinguishing features of the
Taiwanese approach to technological learning. When Korea began to enter the
international electronics markets in the late 1960s, its main concern mirrored that of
the Japanese electronics industry in the early 1950s: master as quickly as possible
those types of production technology that would enable it to capitalize  on its low
labor costs while, at the same time, reaping economies of scale.  Logically, this
implied a focus on rapid capacity and market share expansion primarily through
exports. Given the limited size of Korea´s knowledge and capability base during this
period, it was clear that the growth of the electronics industry would have to occur
primarily on the  basis of foreign technology. It was equally clear that, given the
weakness of the private sector, the government would have to play a leading role.
Our analysis covers four aspects: the catalytic role of foreign direct investment (I.2),
the symbiotic relationship between the government and the chaebol (I.3),
international technology sourcing (I.4), and some characteristic features of Korean
entry strategies.
I.2.The catalytic role of foreign direct investment (FDI)
Initially at least, the electronics industry diverges from the common perception that
FDI has played only a minor role in the development of the Korean model14.
Korea´s electronics exports in fact only started to take off when the country became
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 Evidence for this can be found in the response to the recent devastating price wars in the DRAM
industry. While Korean DRAM producers traditionally had focused on aggressive pricing in order
to gain market share, they now share a common interest with Japanese producers in supply
regulation and in the re-establishment of a stable oligopoly. This however has changed again since
mid-1997, as the Won depreciation has forced Korean producers to return to aggressive pricing
strategies.
14
 Typical examples for this perception are Haggard, 1990, Hikino and Amsden, 1992 and Amsden,
1993.
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a final export platform for a handful of U.S. semiconductor firms ( Ernst, 1994b,
chapter III). This was made possible by the willingness of the Korean government
already during the 1960s to shift to export promotion.  Combined with tough labor
legislation and the ruthless suppression of labor conflicts, the Electronics Industry
Promotion Law of 1969, which made electronics a strategic export industry, and the
opening of the Masan Free Export Zone in 1970  contributed to a positive foreign
investment climate in this industry. The main attractions for foreign electronics
companies were Korea’s cheap female labor and the incredibly long annual work
hours, together with policies favorable to the promotion of export manufacturing.
In 1972, foreign firms, of which there were eight, accounted for about a third of
Korea´s electronics production  and 55 % of its exports; their share in exports fell
below 40% only in 1980 (Bloom, 1992, p.28). By opening up export channels for
assembled chips and for simple consumer devices, FDI did indeed play an important
catalytic role during the critical early phase of the development of the Korean
electronics industry. FDI also exposed Korean workers and managers to some new
organizational techniques, which, while not necessarily “best practice,” certainly
contributed to a gradual erosion of the traditional highly authoritarian Korean
management practices and their inherent rigidities and inefficiencies.  Cost-cutting
and the need to comply to some minimum international quality standards without
any doubt gave rise to some limited indirect learning effects related to the formation
of basic operational capabilities for final assembly, logistics and facility
management (Ernst, 1983, pp.156-166).
I.3. A symbiotic relationship between the government and the chaebol
Yet this was about all that foreign firms were willing to contribute during this early
stage. For that to change, Korea needed systematic and well co-ordinated
government policies to promote the development of Korean firms. Since the mid-
1970s, it is the Korean government, together with the chaebol, that, in a close
symbiotic relationship, became the main carriers of technological learning. This
shift in the center of gravity among the social carriers responsible for the
development of Korea’s electronics industry was due to a number of factors.  In
semiconductor assembly, American firms became increasingly attracted by new
low-cost locations in the Philippines and Malaysia, and gradually shifted most of
13
their assembly activities to these two countries.  Confronted with an increasing cost
of capital, most of these companies were keen to reduce their equity involvement
and began to shift to much looser forms of contract assembly, subcontracting and
OEM arrangements (Ernst , 1997c). Japanese firms, in turn, choose a somewhat
different route, and this applies both to chip assembly and to their activities in other
electronic components. In contrast to the U.S. firms’ reliance on foot-loose offshore
assembly, most Japanese firms concentrated on factory automation at home and
gradually withdrew from offshore assembly activities both in Korea and Taiwan
(Ernst, 1997 a).
Parallel to this process of gradual withdrawal of foreign firms, there have also been
push factors resulting from the increasingly demanding requirements imposed by the
Korean government on foreign firms to contribute to local value-added and to
increase the transfer of technology. Japanese firms in particular were extremely
reluctant to open up their closed international production networks and were
concerned about a possible “boomerang effect” through involuntary technology
leakages.  At the same time, rising competition from the increasingly powerful
chaebol added further pressure on foreign firms.  Confronted with the alternative to
either upgrade their existing investments beyond the stage of assembly and to do so
in cooperation with local firms, or to shift production elsewhere within East Asia,
most of the foreign firms chose the second option.  As a result, Korea today has one
of the lowest rates of inward investment in East Asia, despite serious attempts by
various Korean governments to bring foreign investment back into the country as a
vehicle for accelerated technology diffusion.  Since 1988, Korea has failed to appear
on the list of the preferred ten foreign investment locations for both U.S. and
Japanese electronics firms15.
Policy interventions by the Korean government have played an important role in
shaping the competitive strengths and strategies of Korean electronics firms.
Korea´s successful catching-up in the electronics industry has been based on a
development model that combines four elements: First, its defining element is an
unusually close, almost symbiotic relationship between the the “developmental
state” that defines a national industrial strategy, and huge family-owned
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 Interview with senior official of the Economic Planning Board (EPB), November 1995
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conglomerates, the chaebol16. Second, a rich arsenal of “directed credit”
instruments has been a hallmark of Korea´s industrial policy: access to subsidized
credit and tax privileges has been coupled with strict performance requirements.17
Third, Korea has frequently used selective “infant industry” protection as part of its
industrialization strategy, especially in the electronics industry. But import
protection was mostly coupled with offsetting incentives for export sale, with the
result that overall neutrality was roughly maintained (OTA (1991, p.296)). The
import protection enabled producers in a new industrial sector like electronics to
exploit learning economies, while the export incentives provided the opportunity to
reap scale economies not available in the domestic market. Finally, restrictions to
the inflow and outflow of capital have remained in place until very recently (Kwon
Okyu (1994) and Graham (1994)). This development model worked extremely well,
as long as the goal was catching-up: it succeeded to channel Korea´s large
household savings18 into investment that has produced an incredibly fast expansion
of industrial manufacturing capacity and international market share.
I.4. International technology sourcing
The Korean way of building technological capabilities in the electronics industry
resembles the Japanese model most closely in its utilization of foreign technology.
Rather than letting foreign firms establish local subsidiaries and decide on the speed
and scope of technology diffusion, the government encouraged some of the leading
chaebol to focus on learning and knowledge accumulation through a variety of links
with foreign equipment and component suppliers, technology licensing partners,
OEM clients and minority joint venture partners. By licensing well-proven foreign
product designs and by importing most of the production equipment and  the crucial
components, Korean electronics producers were able to focus most of their attention
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 While originally the government has been in command, its capacity to control the chaebol has
been eroded since the 1980s, due to the increasing power of the latter.
17
 Over time, such performance requirements however became much looser and more difficult to
enforce. There are basically two reaons: the increasing international exposure of the chaebol
which have enabled them to borrow on international capital markets; and poorly designed and
implemented liberalization policies which have blurred existing rules and regulations.
18
 Korea´s gross savings have increased from 15% of GDP in the 1960s to about 35% in the early
1990s (Aliber, (1994), p.341), way above savings ratios in industrialized countries.
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on three areas:19 i) the mastery of production capabilities, initially for assembly, but
increasingly also for related support services and for large mass production lines for
standard products; ii) some related minor change capabilities, ranging from "reverse
engineering" techniques to "analytical design" and some "system engineering"
capabilities that are required for process re-engineering and product customization;
and iii) some investment capabilities, especially the capacity to carry out at short
notice and at low cost investments in the capacity expansion and/or modernization
of existing plants and in the establishment of new production lines.
In order to succeed, Korean electronics firms had to develop the knowledge and
skills that are necessary to monitor, unpackage, absorb and upgrade foreign
technology.  Equally important was a capacity to mobilize the substantial funds for
paying technology licensing fees and for importing "best practice" production
equipment and leading-edge components20.  Most Korean electronics producers
arguably would have hesitated to pursue such high-cost, high-risk strategies had they
not been induced to do so by a variety of selective policy interventions by the
Korean state. Getting relative prices "wrong"(Amsden [1989]) has been important.
Government policies were focused on a judicious combination of export promotion
and import restrictions, sectoral targeting and the channeling of investment funds to
a select group of “national champions”. By providing critical externalities  such as
information, training, maintenance and other support services, and finance, the
Korean government has fostered the growth of firms large enough to overcome high
entry barriers.
Capability formation in the Korean electronics industry historically has been
characterized by a heavy reliance on international technology sourcing. This has
enabled Korean electronics firms to reverse the sequence of technological capability
formation (Dahlman, Ross-Larson and Westphal [1987]). Rather than proceeding
from innovation to investment to production, they could take a short-cut and focus
on the ability to operate production facilities according to competitive cost and
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 For  the underlying conceptual framework of capability formation, see Ernst, Mytelka and
Ganiatsos [1998]. See also the excellent analysis in Bell and Pavitt [1993].
20
 Already in the 1970s, most Korean electronics firms had to pay on average roughly 3% of their
sales for technology licensing fees, a share which since then has increased to more than 12% (Lee
Jin-Joo [1992], pp.132, 139).
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quality standards.  Production capabilities thus were used as the foundation for
developing capabilities in investment and adaptive engineering, while product and
market development and process innovation were postponed to a later stage of
development.  Through "reverse engineering" and other forms of copying and
imitating foreign technology and by integrating into the increasingly complex
international production networks21 of American, Japanese and some European
electronics companies, Korean electronics firms were able to avoid the huge cost
burdens and risks involved in R&D and in developing international distribution and
marketing channels. This was conducive for rapid catching-up. At the same time
however this approach has constrained Korea´s ability to cope with the requirements
of industrial upgrading.
The most prominent form of international technology sourcing are OEM (= original
equipment manufacturing) arrangements. Historically, it made all sense to start with
a focus on assembly based on borrowed technology and to enter international
markets with the help of powerful foreign OEM clients.  Take the example of
consumer electronics22. This is an industry where economies of scale are critical23.
Rapid expansion of market share  thus is an essential prerequisite for successful late
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 The concept of an "international production network"(IPN) is an attempt to capture the spread of
broader and more systemic forms of international production that cover all stages of the value
chain and that  may or may not involve equity ownership. This concept allows us to analyze the
globalization strategies of a particular firm  with regard to the following four questions: 1) Where
does a firm locate which stages of the value chain? 2)To what degree does a firm rely on
outsourcing? What is the importance of inter-firm production networks relative to the firm's
internal production network? 3) To what degree is the control over these transactions exercised in
a centralized or in a decentralized manner? And 4) how  do the different elements of these
networks  hang together? This concept has been developed in studies prepared for the OECD
(Ernst, 1994b), the Sloan Foundation ( Ernst, 1997c); and the Brookings Institution 1997 (Ernst,
1997a)
22
 Learning through OEM arrangements was not confined to the consumer electronics industry.
Substantial spillover effects occurred into other segments of the electronics industry and the
manufacturing sector at large, as some technologies used in consumer electronics products are
similar to those used in industrial and professional electronic systems.  A typical example for such
spillover effects are picture tubes.  Throughout most of the 1980s, computer monitors used to be
built around the same cathode ray tube (CRT) technology that is used in TV sets.  As a result,
Samsung and Goldstar could use the technological capabilities accumulated in the production of
picture tubes for TV sets to establish a strong position as OEM suppliers of computer monitors.
23
 For reasons of quality and reliability, production requires automatic component insertion
machines. Such machines have very high throughputs and can be effectively utilized only in
connection with high-volume assembly operations.  Minimum efficient scale for a color TV plant
for instance typically exceeds 400,00 sets per year, with minimum investment thresholds ranging
between $15 million and $40 million.  Minimum efficient scales are even higher for TV picture
tubes, starting from a minimum capacity of 1.4 million tubes per year, with an estimated $75
million to $90 million as the investment threshold. (Ernst and O'Connor [1992], pages 183-185)
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entry strategies in consumer electronics.  In Korea, the domestic market was clearly
insufficient to exhaust the relevant scale economies.  The main focus thus had to be
on exports.  For a long time, directed credit and Korean consumers had to subsidize
the learning costs of their consumer electronics producers, paying substantially
higher prices for lower quality products.
Korean consumer electronics manufacturers have entered exports by focusing on the
final assembly of mature and proven imported product designs.  Attempts to
upgrade the industry structure were postponed to a later stage.  This specific
industrialization pattern gave rise to a particular pattern of technological learning:
the focus was on the development of production and, linked to that, the capacity to
reproduce similar investment projects.  Production capabilities were primarily
developed for the different stages of final assembly, most of it related to the
insertion of components onto printed circuit boards.  From the mid-1980s onwards,
this was complemented by the development of component manufacturing, especially
for picture tubes and some semiconductors. Yet, very little progress has been
achieved in product design.
Rapid expansion of capacity and international market share would have been
impossible, if Korean firms would have tried to start off with a more integrated
production system.  And OEM arrangements have proven to be one of the most
cost-effective methods for acquiring core capabilities in production and investment.
OEM arrangements provide the supplier with a high volume of business, which
permits the realization of scale economies.  The often tedious and grueling
qualification process that any potential supplier has to pass before he can aspire to
get a contract opens up a variety of learning possibilities about its organizational
deficiencies and technological weaknesses.  In addition, the customer often provides
technical assistance in engineering and manufacturing processes in order to ensure
quality and cost efficiency.  This applies in particular to capabilities in tooling (e.g.,
plastic molds), the lay-out, use and adaptation of automated insertion, soldering and
assembly equipment, and specialized equipment for coil winding and other
operations required for various subassemblies, for instance, of a TV set.  At the very
least, the customer must supply detailed technical “blueprints” to allow the supplier
to produce according to specifications.  The most important immediate advantage is
18
that the customer takes responsibility for marketing and distribution, saving the
OEM supplier substantial investments in those areas.
OEM arrangements, however, can also have substantial drawbacks24.  A firm may
become "locked into" an OEM relationship to the extent that it is hindered from
developing its own independent brand name recognition and marketing channels.
Profit margins are substantially lower in OEM sales than in own brand name sales,
which in turn makes it difficult for the Korean companies to muster the capital
needed to invest in R&D that eventually might lead to the introduction of new
products.  This constraint, however, is of limited importance, as long as sales
volumes through OEM contracts are large and fairly well predictable so that, despite
low profit margins, total earnings may be substantial.
OEM exports continue to account for a substantial share of Korea's consumer
electronics exports. In 1988, around 50% to 60% of all Korean exports of color TV
sets and VCRs were carrying OEM brands (Jun and Kim [1990], p.22).  And four
years later, in 1992, the OEM share of consumer electronics exports was reported to
have increased to nearly 69%.25 Over the last few years, Korean companies have
moved out of low-end OEM arrangements (e.g., for standard, small-sized TV sets)
and strengthened their position for products that require more demanding production
capabilities (e.g., VCRs and computer monitors). In earlier OEM arrangements the
Korean company was basically restricted to printed circuit board (PCB) assembly
and had to purchase most components from the foreign client. More recently,
however, Korean companies have qualified for more demanding OEM arrangements
in which they supply not only the components but are also responsible for detailed
design or for design modification.26
During the late 1980s, everyone in Korea began to talk about the necessity to move
beyond the OEM trap and expectations were running high that, given the substantial
amount of accumulated technological and organizational capabilities, this could be
done without much pain. All of the three major consumer electronics manufacturers
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 An early analysis of such drawbacks can be found in Ernst and O`Connor ( 1989). For an
empirical analysis of the response of Acer and other Taiwanese computer companies to such
drawbacks, see Ernst ( 1998b).
25
  Interview at the Korean Institute of Economics and Technology (KIET), November 1993
26
 For an analysis of the increasing  variety of OEM arrangements and the impact on technology
diffusion, see Ernst (1997c)
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of Korea have since then tried to increase their brand name recognition abroad and
have made huge investments to build up an overseas marketing, distribution and
service network.  In some cases, such attempts have worked quite well, as for
Samsung's TV sets and VCRs for the low-end market segments in the United States,
and for Daewooís microwave ovens in France.  In most cases, however, the
transition to original brand name (OBN) strategies has been rough and full of
pitfalls.  After years of heavy advertising and PR promotion, Korean electronics
firms must still contend with an image that their products are of inferior quality and
reliability.
Product development is still primarily conceived as a gradual improvement of a
given Japanese product design. Due to their heavy reliance on OEM manufacturing,
Korean companies are very much followers of the latest product designs developed
elsewhere, mostly in Japan. In the words of a manager of the LG group: "We are
used to take Sony, Hitachi and Matsushita as our natural benchmarks without ever
asking whether we could do it better."27 Korean firms have a weak capacity to
develop new designs and to collect early on the relevant information on new market
trends and customer preferences.28   This applies to TV sets, VCRs and audio
equipment as well as to household appliances, in which Korean companies continue
to depend to a considerable degree on OEM arrangements to keep up with the fast
changing international markets.
Strategic marketing continues to play a marginal role in the Korean innovation
process.  The goals of innovation are set by the established foreign benchmark
firms.  Almost no attempt has been made until very recently to identify still
undiscovered customer needs and to use this knowledge to develop new markets. It
should be mentioned however that, over the last few years, all three chaebol active
in consumer electronics have identified this passive acceptance of foreign product
designs as a major barrier to sustained competitiveness.  All three are now
considering or have started to implement important organizational reforms that
should enable them to link together more closely strategic marketing and innovation
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  Interview at the LG group, November 1993
28
 This contrasts sharply  with  Taiwan's PC industry, in which early access to market intelligence
enables firms to accelerate speed-to-market and to continuously upgrade their products. For
evidence, see San Gee and Wen-Jeng Kuo [1998] and Ernst, 1998b.
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management.  All three also claimed that they have now inter-disciplinary product
teams working on original product designs.  The fact that top management is now
more willing to spend substantial resources on original brand design may help to
break the old passive design mentality. Such a change is overdue.  Product life
cycles have been drastically shortened both for consumer electronics and for PC-
related products. Competitive success thus increasingly depends on whether a firm
is able to rapidly adapt its product designs to the changing requirements of the main
international export markets.
I.5. Entry strategies: the example of semiconductors
The pace and scale of the capacity and market share expansion of Korea´s
semiconductor industry is unprecedented in the history of the electronics industry.
Never before has a country been able to move so rapidly from the position of an
insignificant outsider to that of the market leader in a highly capital-intensive
industry saddled with incredibly high risks and entry barriers29. How was it possible
that Samsung, together with LG and Hyundai, were able to enter the DRAM market
at record speed and to erode the once seemingly watertight grip that a tight Japanese
oligopoly had come to impose on this industry since the mid-1980s?
Two external factors need to be mentioned upfront, before we can discuss how the
Korean way of building technological capabilities may have contributed to this
success. The first is a probably unintended, yet very consequential side effect of the
September 1986 U.S.-Japanese agreement on trade in semiconductors: due to the
unrealistically high price floors set for DRAM imports into the United States,
Korean producers were able to outprice their Japanese rivals at price levels that, in
1989, began to generate substantial profits ( Ernst, (1987)).  A second external
factor has been the strategic decision of U.S. semiconductor producers and computer
companies to create an alternative, low-cost source for DRAMs in order to tamper
oligopolistic pricing and supply behavior of the Japanese majors (Ernst and
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 In Ernst (1994b, I have analyzed the development of Korea´s semiconductor industry (chapter II)
and documented how the leading Korean semiconductor producer Samsung Electronics was  able
to enter the manufacturing of computer memories, despite the existence of substantial entry
barriers (chapter IV).
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O'Connor [1992]).  It is plausible to assume that, without these two external factors,
Korea may have had a much harder time entering the DRAM market segment.
As for the Korean contribution, the first factor to mention is the willingness and the
capacity to spend huge amounts of money on investment and technology
acquisition.30 Between 1983 and 1989, the three chaebol are reported to have
invested more than $4 billion on production equipment.  This amount can be
considered to be the original entry fee.  But while catching-up is already quite
costly, keeping-up and getting ahead leads to an even higher fixed capital cost
burden.  Since 1987, annual capital spending has increased from $800 million to an
estimated $1.8 billion in 1993, which in that year equalled more than 20% of the
world's total semiconductor facility investment31.
In order to get an impression of the tremendous overall cost involved in Korea's
entry into semiconductors, let us first compare, for the five years between 1988 and
1992, cumulative capital spending with cumulative sales.  We find that on an
average Korean semiconductor chaebol had to spend nearly 51% of their
semiconductor sales on capital investment, $5.7 billion out of a sales total of $10.2
billion32 .  As if this would not already be enough, we need to add the quite
substantial licensing fees that Korean semiconductor producers have to pay for U.S.
and Japanese technology.  It is estimated that in 1992 and 1993 the Korean
semiconductor industry had to spend 14% and 16% of its annual turnover on royalty
payments, i.e. $281 million and $322 million respectively.  85% of these payments
were reported to go to the U.S. semiconductor industry, which provides an
interesting and somewhat surprising contrast to Korea`s otherwise high dependence
on Japanese technology, especially for consumer electronics.
A second important prerequisite of Korea's successful entry into semiconductors
relates to the specific nature of the technology acquisition strategies pursued.  These
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32
 Sales figures provided by Dataquest, September 1993
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strategies were based on a judicious combination of three main elements which
enabled the chaebol to participate in international technology networks and to
maximize their internal learning possibilities.  First, all of them established early on
subsidiaries in Silicon Valley that served as listening posts for intelligence gathering
on technology and market trends. These subsidiaries were also used for R&D
activities that complemented and helped to direct or correct similar efforts at home.
A second element of technology acquisition has been a pervasive reliance on
"second-sourcing" agreements in which the chaebol were licensed by leading U.S.
and Japanese semiconductor producers to manufacture some of their DRAM designs
33
 .    The chaebol also used a third approach to technology acquisition through
contract manufacturing, the so-called silicon foundry services provided for leading
American ASIC (application specific integrated circuit) companies like LSI Logic
and VLSI Technology.  Based on the gate array or standard cell designs received
from these foreign companies, the chaebol used their strength in process technology
and their capacity to rapidly improve yields to produce such devices at short notice.
Being forced to comply to the stringent design rules typical for ASIC devices, the
chaebol thus were able to deepen their knowledge about necessary process
improvements.
More recently, there has been a tendency to combine these different individual
approaches into somewhat broader package deals aimed at cross-technology-
sharing.  As the chaebol expanded their share in international DRAM markets, they
were able to strengthen their bargaining position with regard to licensing
agreements, as a result of which we now witness an increasing trend towards cross-
licensing and mutual patent swaps, which today link all of the chaebol with the
leading Japanese semiconductor producers.  More and more, the chaebol get
involved in international technology sourcing networks, which include links with
other firms (inter-firm networks) and attempts to tap into and use key elements of
the national innovation systems of other countries (inter-organizational networks).
These networks now typically cover a great variety of arrangements, ranging from
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 Examples of such second-sourcing include the following link-ups: Goldstar with AT&T (for 256K
DRAMs) and Hitachi (for 1Mbit and 4Mbit DRAMs); Hyundai with Texas Instruments (for 256K
and 1Mbit DRAMs); and Samsung with Micron Technology (256K DRAMs), and Intel
(microcontrollers, microprocessors, DRAMs and EPROMs -- erasable programmable read-only
memories). Some of these arrangements are analyzed in detail in Ernst 1994a.
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second-sourcing and fabrication agreements to technology licensing and cross
licensing, patent swapping, joint product or technology development, the exchange
of researchers and guest engineers, and standard coalitions (e.g., for RISC (reduced
instruction set computing) and flash memories).  Within a few years, technology
acquisition approaches pursued by Korean semiconductor producers thus have
experienced major changes, moving from the "reverse engineering" of licensed chip
designs to much broader and increasingly systemic forms of international
technology sourcing.
II. Truncated Industrial Upgrading: What are the Limits to the
Korean Model?
II.1. A simplified model
Much of the literature on Korea remains married to a perspective of comparative
statics: the main concern is to distill key features of the Korean model and to set this
model apart from the experience in other countries34. The underlying concern is to
demonstrate how this medium-sized country at the periphy of the world economy
was able to develop in the face of adversity and dependence. Such an approach
certainly has played an important role in correcting some fundamental
misconceptions in development economics, with regard to the role of the state and
the role of firms as the central carriers of industrial upgrading. There is now a wide
consensus that “…markets and governments are complementary. The state is
essential for putting in place the appropriate institutional foundations for markets.”
(Joseph Stiglitz, chief economist of the World Bank,  quoted in the Financial Times,
June 26, 1997)
Yet, this approach is no longer sufficient today. In order to understand what went
wrong with the Korean model, it is necessary to focus on the dynamics of change35.
In order to understand how learning and capability formation have shaped over time
Korea's economic development, one must address questions like: What are the
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 This is in line with evolutionary economics, andits  applications to economic development and the
growth of the firm. (Freeman, 1982; Nelson and Winer, 1982; Dosi et al, 1988; Lundvall, 1992;
Nelson, 1992; Bell and Pavitt, 1993; Nelson and Pack, 1995; Gu Shulin, 1996; Lall, 1997;  and
Ernst and Lundvall, 1997)
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limits to the Korean model? What changes did occur in response to these limitations
in the institutional set-up and policies that constitute Korea's innovation system?
And how have these changes affected Korea's capacity for industrial upgrading?
It is now time to identify some important weaknesses of the Korean model. I argue
that the very same model of development that has been conducive for rapid
catching-up has acted as a major barrier for a further upgrading of the electronics
industry. In order to explain this puzzle, I will use the following simplified model of
truncated industrial upgrading. I assume that firm strategies are conditioned by
government policies and industry structure. These two factors also interact:
government policies are shaped by the existing industry structure; in turn, they also
determine its evolution. Industrial upgrading and firm growth condition the need for,
and the ability of, governments to intervene36.
A distinguishing feature of the Korean model has been a symbiotic relationship
between governments and large business groups (the chaebol). This has given rise to
the following vicious circle of truncated industrial upgrading: i) a heavy reliance
on credit and ii) an extremely unbalanced industry structure have led to iii) a
narrow knowledge base, and iv) a sticky pattern of specialization. The development
of Korea´s electronics industry fits the pattern of large-scale, capital-intensive
latecomer industrialization described by Gerschenkron (1962): easy access to large
amounts of patient debt capital has been a critical source of competitive strength for
the Korean chaebol. This has shaped key features of corporate strategy in terms of
product specialization, type of production, size of commitment and entry strategy,
vertical integration, competition focus and technology management. Korea's
successful entry into the electronics industry has been a forced march to develop a
mass production capacity that can serve high-growth export markets for
homogeneous products; very little upgrading has occurred into higher-end and
rapidly growing market segments for differentiated products and services. Once a
decision has been made to enter a sector, the chaebol normally move in on a massive
scale and in a highly integrated manner. By channeling funds at concessionary terms
to a handful of chaebol, the state has created powerful domestic oligopolies. Korea´s
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extremely unbalanced industry structure has given rise to a peculiar form of
competition strategy: firm growth has occurred through octopus-like diversification
into many different and unrelated industries rather than through an accumulation of
knowledge through industrial upgrading. The result has been a narrow domestic
knowledge base, which in turn has made it difficult to move up the ladder of
specialization.
This development model has worked well, as long as major export markets kept
growing rapidly. As we will see in the next sections, this is no longer the case today.
The result is over-capacity and price wars, as well as to a dramatic increase in the
country's exposure to debt. After three decades of rapid growth, Korea is now facing
a major crisis. External factors, caused by the volatility of international financial
markets, have acted as a catalyst; yet the root causes for this crisis are primarily
home-made. A failure to upgrade is one important reason for Korea´s vulnerability
to the current crisis in the financial and currency markets: it has reduced the capacity
of Korean firms to generate a sufficiently large amount of foreign exchange that is
necessary to service their huge debt.
In what follows, I first review evidence on two indicators of truncated industrial
upgrading: a sticky specialization pattern (II.2.), and a narrow domestic knowledge
base (II.3.). I then discuss the role of two explanatory factors: Korea´s high-debt
growth model (II.4.) and its unbalanced industry structure (II.5.)
II.2. Sticky specialization
Specialization is an important indicator of the degree of industrial upgrading that a
country has achieved. Industrial economists distinguish specialization patterns that
reflect differences in the product mix (homogeneous versus differentiated
products37), and in the types of production process (mass production versus flexible
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instance, Baumol, Panzer and Willig (1982) and Nilsson (1996).
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production). Various attempts have also been made to develop generic sectoral
specialization categories that combine key aspects of this simple matrix 38.
Let us now look at the product mix that is typical for Korea´s electronics industry39.
A fundamental problem is a sticky pattern of specialization: the focus has been on
capacity and international market share expansion for homogeneous, mass-produced
products; with few exceptions, Korea has failed to upgrade into higher-end and
rapidly growing market segments for differentiated products that require flexible
production. Almost without exception, the chaebol have targeted those segments of
the electronics industry that require huge investment outlays and sophisticated mass
production techniques for fairly homogeneous products  like microwave ovens, TV
sets, VCRs, computer monitors, picture tubes and computer memories, especially
DRAMs. Korean electronics firms typically have focused on the mass production of
capital-intensive homogeneous products that are characterized by huge investment
thresholds and proven technologies. Overwhelmingly, the focus has been on
consumer electronics and components, with only limited inroads into industrial
electronics. This is in line with our argument that sticky specialization is a major
characteristic of the Korean model. In the more design-intensive sectors of the
computer industry, Korean chaebol however lag well behind Taiwanese firms.
Burdened with unimpressive “me too” products, they have all failed to establish
themselves as credible competitors.
Sticky specialization in semiconductors
A particularly disturbing feature of Korea´s  specialization pattern is that it typically
combines high investment thresholds and highly volatile income streams: in their
choice of sectors, the chaebol are willing to take considerable risk that result from
highly volatile markets. Typical examples are DRAMs and advanced displays that
are prone to periodic boom-and-bust cycles and hence do not generate a steady flow
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of profits. For companies with a high debt-equity ratio, this is obviously not an
optimal choice40.
Take the case of DRAMs41.  Let me first clarify the nature of the technological
capabilities required for the production of these devices.  Five of them can be
discerned: wafer production, circuit design, wafer fabrication, assembly and
packaging, and testing.   In a nutshell: Korea has excellent assembly capabilities
over a broad range of products.  Its wafer fabrication capabilities are excellent or
good for a limited number of products, i.e., DRAMs, SRAMs and ROMs. Other
than that, very little has been achieved, and there continue to be glaring deficits in
particular for circuit design.
Of much greater importance however is that Korea's semiconductor industry is
based on an extremely weak foundation, in terms of the materials and production
equipment required.  In the early 1990s, 90% of the production equipment had to be
imported, with 50% originating from Japan.  It will be extremely difficult to reduce
this dependence. Only joint production with leading overseas manufacturers is likely
to help.  There is some evidence now that this pragmatic strategy may work. One
reason is that the cash-stripped chaebol are eager to establish joint ventures with
American and Japanese electronics firms. Already before the crisis, leading U.S.
producers like Applied Materials, Lam Research and Varian Associates have
concluded such joint ventures, as Korea had become a major market for
semiconductor production equipment42
Levels of import dependence are also quite high for semiconductor materials,
particularly for high value special materials.  Korea's current annual consumption of
semiconductors materials is approximately $600 million, with 70% of total
consumption being imported (40% from Japan and 20% from the United States).
Some progress has been made in the domestic production of silicon wafers, using
foreign technology obtained either through licensing or joint ventures.  Most
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domestic production, however, is still restricted to relatively simple materials like
lead frame, bonding wire and packaging materials for chip assembly.
Probably the most important weakness relates to circuit design and the limited
capacity of Korean firms to broaden their product portfolio and to develop new
products and markets.  Beyond DRAMs and some other memories like Static
Random Access Memories (SRAM) and Erasable Programmable Read-only
Memories (EPROM), Korean firms have played no role at all in international
semiconductor markets.  In other words, Korean firms are only able to compete in a
particular segment of the world market, DRAMs, that currently generate roughly 24
% of worldwide semiconductor revenues (Dataquest, 1996).  Korea's competitive
position in semiconductors thus remains highly fragile.  The three leading Korean
semiconductor producers in fact are all heavily dependent on computer memories:
80% of Samsung's semiconductor revenues come from memories, and in the case of
Goldstar and Hyundai, this share is even higher, i.e., 87% and 90%43It is this heavy
dependence on memories, and especially on DRAMs, which clearly distinguishes
the Korean semiconductor industry from its international competitors and keeps
them in a highly vulnerable position.  This vulnerability results from the fact that
demand for DRAMs is highly volatile, while investment thresholds continue to
grow rapidly. In the case of the largest Japanese semiconductor producer, NEC, for
example, only 35% of its semiconductor revenues were generated by MOS (metal
oxide on silicon) memories.
The key issue today for the Korean semiconductor industry is whether or not it will
succeed in broadening its product portfolio and move beyond computer memories.
As technology management is still overwhelmingly dominated by a production bias,
I am somewhat skeptical to what degree and how fast design and product
development capabilities can be developed. If such changes in the product mix do
not come soon, this may have quite negative consequences.  The absence of Korea
from most international semiconductor markets has led to a very unbalanced
international trade structure, which may not be sustainable for long: Korea
continuously  has a huge trade surplus for memory chips, while at the same time
                                                
43 Figures are courtesy of the Korean Semiconductor Industry Association (KSIA).
29
accumulating equally huge deficits for microprocessors, ASICs and video image
chips.
The narrow focus on memory products also has very negative implications for the
overall structure of the electronics industry at large.  Korea keeps exporting more
than 90% of its total semiconductor output, while at the same time importing more
than 87% of its domestic demand. Such an extreme imbalance between supply and
demand makes it very difficult to broaden and deepen forward and backward
linkages within the electronics industry and to place it onto a more viable basis. It is
probably fair to say that Korea's semiconductor industry represents today a modern
version of the classical mono-product export enclave, characterized by a minimum
of linkages with the domestic economy.  There is, however, one important
difference: as shown before, the cost for entering the semiconductor industry is
horrendously high, and certainly exceeds that of entering the plantation industry.
It is necessary to place Korea's entry strategy into the semiconductor industry into
the proper context.  While catching-up in this industry has been a major
achievement, it should not be interpreted to imply that Samsung, Goldstar and
Hyundai have been able to move beyond their strength in mass production and that
they have now established a firm foothold in highly R&D-intensive forms of
industrial production.  The very high entry barriers typical for DRAMs are due less
to their R&D intensity than to their capital-intensity, very high economies of scale
and the extremely volatile nature of demand for these devices.  The minimum
efficient scale for producing these devices is now more than $1 billion of annual
sales.  This implies that only firms that have reached the critical threshold of 5% of
world production can compete successfully.44  Competition in DRAMs centers on
the capacity to invest in huge mega-plants churning out a limited variety of standard
products and on the capacity to improve as quickly as possible yields and
productivity.  Wafer fabrication lines thus are typical examples of mass production.
In contrast to microprocessors, logic and analogue devices, DRAM designs are not
complex at all. The main focus is on improving process technology and thus
learning economies and yields, primarily through continuous improvements on the
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shopfloor and tedious trial-and-error.  DRAM designs need to be simple, repetitive
and safe enough, so that the risks and complications entailed in producing these
devices with complex process technologies are minimized.  The device should be
easily testable in order to isolate defects.  With progressive miniaturization, this last
requirement becomes even more important -- the circuits become so tiny that if
defects cannot be located by electrical testing, finding them becomes prohibitively
expensive. To compete in the DRAM market, a firm must be able to mobilize huge
investment funds, implement complex investment projects quickly and at low cost,
and have sufficient financial clout to discount the periodic huge losses that result
from extremely volatile demand and the periodic emergence of huge surplus
capacities. Once these fundamentals are in place, a firm needs to organize its
production in such a way that it can rapidly improve yields and be the first to the
market as the lowest--cost supplier.
Until the outbreak of the financial crisis, the chaebol were well placed to cope with
such entry requirements.  They had guaranteed  access to "patient capital" and ample
opportunities for internal "cross-subsidization" and thus were among the few firms
world-wide that could cope with the demanding financial requirements of the
DRAM business.  The chaebol also have been able to accumulate increasingly
sophisticated production and investment capabilities, both in typical mass
production industries like cars and consumer durables and in resource-intensive
process industries like the steel industry. After the financial crisis hit, this is no
longer the case.
It is probably fair to say that Korea's entry strategy into semiconductors did not
fundamentally differ from its earlier entry into shipbuilding, the steel industry, or the
production of picture tubes for TV sets and monitors.  What DRAMs share with
these other industries is that success does not require a strength in research and
technology development, at least not during the initial entry phase.  Rather, the
success of the chaebol has been primarily a result of their capacity  to raise
incredibly large funds for high-risk investments into huge mass-production lines for
standard products.  High risks in this case do not result from technological
uncertainty but  from the extremely volatile nature of demand and from the periodic
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emergence of huge surplus capacities.45  In other words, competition in DRAMs is
of a fairly conventional nature, with size, economies of scale and first mover
advantages being of primary importance.  Korea's success in this particular segment
of the semiconductor industry should thus not be construed to indicate that Korea is
now able to compete in the so-called "new industrial paradigm" industries.  This, on
the other hand, should not belittle our appreciation of the impressive achievements
that Korean companies have made in the mass production of computer memories.
Impact of sticky specialization
It is due to his sticky pattern of specialization that I think we have to be careful with
statements which claim that Korean firms “make products that sell in the most
demanding markets - if the exchange rate is right.” (Veneroso and Wade (1998, p.1)
As Korea has failed to upgrade its industry structure and product mix, such a
statement may in fact be no longer true today. Since the early 1990s, there has been
a disturbing change in the destination of Korea´s exports away from the demanding
American and European markets towards an increasing reliance on emerging
markets. Take  for instance the share of Korean exports that today goes to ASEAN
countries, China and Taiwan: from almost zero only a few years ago, it has
increased to almost 30%46. Korea , meanwhile, is losing market share in the U.S.
and Europe.
A high dependence on emerging markets has three substantial disadvantages: i)
there is a decline in competitive pressures to upgrade product performance and
quality; ii) there is less exposure to sophisticated customers; and iii) it gives rise to
an extreme vulnerability to exchange rate fluctuations. Probably the most serious
consequence of sticky specialization is that it will constrain international market
share expansion. Take again the case of the electronics industry: There are now clear
limitations to a further rapid growth of exports to Korea´s major markets in OECD
countries. The first warning signs came in 1992 when electronics exports to the U.S.
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and Japan experienced a decline of 2.5% and 6.1% respectively, causing an overall
decline of Korean electronics exports in this year (Ernst, 1994b, p.109). While
exports grew again till the first half of 1996, an increasing share of these exports
now consists of price-sensitive lower-end consumer devices and components for the
less demanding emerging markets. By mid-1996, this surge in exports has fizzled
out: most recent figures show a decline of  more than 2%  in the value of Korea´s
electronics exports during the first half of 199747.
II.3. A narrow domestic knowledge base
A narrow domestic knowledge base is another indicator of Korea´s truncated
industrial upgrading. Catching-up required a limited set of capabilities: a capacity to
absorb and upgrade imported foreign technology and to develop operational
capabilities in production, investment and minor adaptations48. This is no longer
sufficient today. In 1995, an OECD review of Korea´s NSI concluded: "The country
can no longer afford simply to import technology - which foreigners are in fact more
and more reticent to introduce on concessional terms - and will have to raise the
value-added and technological intensity of what it produces." (OECD, 1995b, p.5)
Today, there is an even more powerful reason for such a shift in Korea´s
development paradigm: the country simply does not have the foreign exchange
required to buy in foreign technology49.
Korea thus needs to create a broad-based and diversified knowledge base, especially
with regard to product design, market development, the production of key
components and the provision of high-end knowledge intensive support services.
Such a shift in Korea's development paradigm is overdue and needs to occur rapidly:
"Today, time is running out, as Korea's success in mastering world-level technology
has made foreign firms increasingly reluctant to license their technology to Korea
without receiving technology of equivalent value in return. As a result, although the
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Korean ...(NSI) ... has made extraordinary progress in a very short time, Korea's
continued rapid economic growth requires even more rapid development of its
capacity to use domestic sources of research and talent to innovate." (OECD, 1995
b, pages 13 and 14). So far however, Korea´s knowledge base is constrained by
three main weaknesses: an insufficient critical mass of R&D; gross inefficiencies of
corporate technology management; and equally important inefficiencies of its public
innovation system.
i) An insufficient critical mass
Until around the mid-1980s, Korean electronics firms had little motivation to invest
in R&D, for the following reasons: First, rapid capacity and market share expansion
was much easier, if production was based on imported machines and technology.
Second, price competition depended primarily on a combination of low labor costs
and selective government support and protection: competing for government
resources and contracts has been the essence of competition. Third, continuously
high rates of inflation and high interests have acted as powerful disincentives to
R&D expenditures: they have driven investment into real estate speculation rather
than into high-risk R&D. Fourth, industrial promotion policies were biased towards
quantitative goals and neglected industrial upgrading: firms received support “… on
the basis of their export volumes … irrespective of their achievements in capital and
labor productivities, value-added, and technologies (Sun G. Kim ( 1995), p.103)
Over the 1980s Korea’s comparative labor cost advantages eroded, product life
cycles shortened and competition intensified in the electronics industry.  In response
to these changes, the Korean electronics industry slowly began to develop its own
R&D capacity.  Between 1980 and 1984 the number of industry-managed R&D
institutes increased from 8 to 32.  In addition 3 government research institutes and
11 co-operatives run by small- and medium-sized enterprises were operating by
mid-decade.  The increased attention to R&D was also reflected in the growth of
company spending on R&D, which reached over 3% of turnover in 1985.  This was
stimulated by tax concessions.
The real growth in R&D activity, however, only dates to the late 1980s.  In 1985, for
example, there were 5,249 persons engaged in R&D in the electronics industry, and
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this accounted for 32% of the researchers in all Korean industry50.  By 1990 this
number had risen to 12,865 and accounted for 37% of total R&D personnel in
Korean industry.  A year later there were 15,923 people engaged in R&D in the
electronics industry, 41% of total R&D personnel in industry. Korean researchers
also began to apply for and to register patents.  The number of patent applications
rose from 2,552 per year in 1983-85 to 6,322 per year in 1986-88 and reached
11,320 per year in 1989-91.  Of this number a total number of 11,912 patents were
registered over the period 1983-91. Yet, compared to their international competitors,
the overall number of patents accumulated by Korean firms has remained fairly
insignificant, and indicates that there is still a long way to go.
While Korea´s R&D expenditures rose faster than its GDP, increasing its share in
GDP from 1.8% in 1985 to 2.4% in 1994 ( OECD ( 1995a), fig.1, p.47), this still
leaves Korea way behind the main OECD economies.  Already in 1986, the
R&D/GNP ratio for Japan was 2.8%, while both the United States and the then
Federal Republic of Germany reached 2.7% (Mowery [1993], table 1).  In order to
reach a “critical mass” for industrial upgrading, R&D investments in Korea still
have to grow much further.  The most vivid illustration is that, in comparison to
GM’s R&D budget, Korea’s total R&D expenditures amount to only 54% (Kim
Linsu ( 1997)).
Important changes have also occurred in the funding of Korea’s R&D investments:
the share of public sector R&D investment in the nation’s total R&D expenditure
experienced a dramatic fall, from 68% in 1978 to 17% in 1993 (OECD (1995a),
table 2, p. 107). Today, roughly 80% of R&D expenditures are carried out by private
firms; private firms also recruit nearly 60% of Korea´s R&D personnel. That implies
that in terms of sheer numbers, the private sector today has become the main driving
force behind the country’s R&D investments.  In constant prices, R&D spending in
the manufacturing sector has more than quadrupled between 1976 and 1990.  What
is particularly noteworthy is that firms have  expanded their R&D expenditures
substantially faster than their sales: R&D spending as a ratio of total sales increased
from 0.36% in 1976 to 1.96% in 1990.  While this is an impressive achievement, it
is still less than half of the current R&D/sales ratios of U.S. and Japanese
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manufacturing companies.  In other words, for private sector R&D investments, the
same caveat applies as for Korea’s overall R&D investment: it is still substantially
below the critical threshold level required for moving beyond the technology
catching-up stage.
ii) Inefficiencies of corporate technology management
What really matters however is the quality of the R&D output, i.e. the efficiency of
technology management. Patent figures indicate that Korea has a problem: while it
spends more than twice the amount for R&D compared to Taiwan, the number of
patents granted to Koreans by the U.S. in 1992 was only 538 compared to 1252
patents to Taiwanese (Kim Linsu ( 1997b) , p.15)). Korea's innovation system
continues to be dominated by a handful of chaebol: they can recruit the best
scientists, engineers and managers, and their strategies determine the country's
research agenda51. Serious problems have been detected with regard to the
effectiveness of the chaebol's innovation management 52.  While external
technology sourcing strategies are highly sophisticated, the organization of
innovation within these firms remains rather ineffectual and there is a huge potential
for reorganization and productivity improvement.  Organizational conservatism
continues to prevail.  If changes occur, they follow an outdated centralized R&D
model.  In contrast to the progressive decentralization of R&D which is typical
today for Japanese, U.S. and European firms and which has led to an increasing
outsourcing of technological development, "... the Korean manufacturing industry is
still at the stage of establishing centralized R&D laboratories with the objective of
concentrating scarce resources in R&D" (Kim Il Yong and Chung SunYang [1991],
p.6).
This is true in particular for the leading electronics companies.  As they face
growing restrictions in the international technology markets, these firms have
                                                                                                                                        
Korea (EIAK).
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 For evidence, see II.5.
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 See in particular Kim Sun G. (ed.) [1995]; Kim Hwan Suk [1991] and [1993]; Kim Il Yong and
Chung Sun Yang [1991]; Kim Il Yong and Kim Chi Yong [1991]; Kim Linsu [1992] and [1993];
and Kim S. Ran, 1996. While Bloom[1992] shares  much of the diagnosis with the afore-
mentioned authors, he proposes a quite different therapy. For him, strengthening the chaebol
would be the safest way to upgrade technological capabilities to the new competitive
requirements.
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shifted to quite extreme forms of centralized in-house technology generation.
Successful innovation however requires continual and numerous interactions and
feedbacks among a great variety of economic actors and across all stages of the
value chain (OECD[1992], chapters 1-3).  Organizing R&D in a centralized manner
is bound to produce rigid procedures concerning information management and
decision-making, with the result that product design cycles and speed-to-market
become much too long.  In addition, centralized R&D organizations are ill-equipped
to coordinate the complex requirements of innovation.  Feedback loops across the
value chain thus remain weak and unreliable, and design, marketing and
manufacturing often proceed in an asynchronous way.
One important difference between Korea and Japan is that in Korea hierarchical
patterns of firm organization are still much more prevalent ( Janelli and Yim
Dawnhee, (1993)). This has important negative implications for the organization of
R&D: Korean engineers and technicians are more inclined to work on their own and
are much less willing to contribute to a team than their Japanese counterparts. While
companies like Samsung and LG may have succeeded to overcome some of this
resistance to teamwork, this is the exception rather than the rule. Korean engineers
are also much less willing to dirty their hands and to get involved in tedious trial-
and-error work required to solve a variety of shop-floor problems. A survey of
managers of Japanese affiliates in Korea concluded that, “… individually, many of
their local employees are hard-working but as a group they do not cooperate well,
stick to their own territory and are not concerned about the territory of others.”
(Oki(1993), p.47). The same survey also stressed the “absence of information
exchanges and extensive cooperation” that is typical for Japanese firms.
A bias in Korea for centralized R&D organizations also has quite negative
implications beyond the boundaries of the firm.  It is probably one of the main
reasons for the still very weak status of domestic linkages among the different actors
involved in the process of technology generation and diffusion.  This applies in
particular to linkages between the large electronics manufacturing companies and
their suppliers of parts and components53.  Most of these links are either with
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 There is now a rich body of theoretical and empirical literature that shows that both end product
manufacturers and component suppliers can reap substantial benefits from vertical production
networks . Such networks make possible a shift to a new division of labor in R&D: they enable
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foreign companies or are internalized by the leading chaebol (Bloom [1992]).  Both
links have considerable disadvantages.  Reliance on imported components not only
contributes to a continuous foreign exchange drain, but also has reduced
substantially the local value-added and the learning possibilities involved in the
design and manufacturing of the relevant components.  In the second case, excessive
vertical integration leads to very high fixed capital cost burdens and limited
flexibility.  As long as components are only for in-house consumption, chances are
low that they will correspond to "world class" standards.
iii) Inefficiencies of Korea´s public innovation system54
Important inefficiencies also exist in Korea´s public innovation system. While the
government´s share of R&D has declined to less than 20%, it is still large enough to
play an important role. Yet, there is a serious lack of coordination among R&D
programs of different ministries which has wasted Korea´s scarce resources. The
current mechanism for priority-setting is highly imperfect: each ministry sets up its
own program and basically feels free to pursue its own goals without much
consideration for any necessary coordination among these different programs55.
Traditionally, powerful informal social networks among key bureaucrats, politicians
and chaebol managers have been able to remedy some of these weaknesses.
However, as the country has moved toward more democratic institutions with the
result of more stringent transparency requirements, such informal coordination
mechanisms have been eroded. The current distribution of government R&D
represents more the power of different ministries than the needs of the Korean
                                                                                                                                        
manufacturing firms to concentrate on system design and final assembly and thus to restrict their
R&D primarily to product design and process innovations for final assembly.  Suppliers, in turn,
can focus their limited resources on product and process innovations for parts and components
and thus can aspire to accumulate specialized technological capabilities. See, for instance:
Antonelli (ed.)[1989]; Imai and Baba [1991]; Antonelli and Foray[1991]; Sabel et al. [1991];
Bieber et al. [1991]; OECD [1992a], chapter 3, Ernst [1994a] [1997a] and (1997c).
54
 The following is based on discussions with Dr. Lee Won-Young from the  Science & Technology
Policy Institute (STEPI), Seoul, Korea. See also Lee Won-Young (1995). See also OECD (1995a
and b).
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 In principle, two institutions are supposed to exercise control: the Inter-Ministerial Council of
Science and Technology and the Ministry of Finance`s Budget Office. In reality however both
institutions are ill-equipped to guarantee effective coordination. The Council does not have much
influence on the decisions of the Budget Office, with the result that few ministries bother to
consult the Council before requesting their R&D budget. And the Budget Office, being woefully
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society. For instance, the share of defense technology has been increasing from
roughly 21% in 1990 to 27% in 1994 and is now the second largest component of
the R&D budget. There have been various attempts to overcome this lack of
coordination: the Ministry of Science& Technology (MOST) for instance has
prepared a Long-Term Plan on Science and Technology toward the Year 2010. But
none of these moves have changed very much.
As long as the goal was catching-up, Korea almost exclusively relied on one set of
actors: the government research institutes (GRIs). Their main purpose was to
compensate for the then still very weak R&D activities of private firms and to assist
and support them in the assimilation and adaptation of imported foreign
technologies. We have seen that this has changed since the mid-1980s, with the
result that the private sector is now responsible for more than 80% of Korea´s total
R&D. But this private R&D has a very narrow focus: most of it is geared to
development rather than research, especially process re-engineering and product
customization. This leads to a paradoxical result: The chaebol which have the funds
for research, neglect it and prefer to focus on development activities. This is also
reflected in their recruitment policies: only 8% of the Korean PhD holders work for
private firms. This has led to a wasteful vicious circle of blocking research needed
for industrial upgrading. The main cause is a fundamental mismatch in the
allocation of R&D funds and recruitment. Nearly 80% of the government´s civilian
R&D funds go to GRIs. This is much higher than even in France and Japan - two
countries where the government traditionally has played a strong role in the national
innovation system. Yet, due to the recent deterioriation of salaries and social status
in GRIs, there is now a heavy brain drain from GRIs to universities. Korean
universities which employ 76% of the PhD holders, however lack the research
facilities and funds to conduct serious research: receiving less than 11% of the
government civilian R&D funds, Korean universities are in a much weaker position
than even in Japan, where universities are also quite weak in terms of R&D. Such
fundamental imbalances in the allocation of human resoruces (researchers) and
research funds have led to a tremendous wastage of the country´s most precious
resources - a system that addressed extremely well the requirements of catching-up,
                                                                                                                                        
under-staffed and lacking science and technology experts, is hardly qualified to make the right
decisions.
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is incapable of generating a critical mass of domestic research that is needed for
successful industrial upgrading.
A further important weakness of the Korean innovation system, paradoxically
enough, relates to the established educational system.  Its heavy focus on the
training of mid-level managers, engineers and technicians has been an important
prerequisite of success during the catching-up phase.  Yet today, as the focus shifts
to research, product design and market development, the educational system is
poorly equipped to cope with these new requirements. Korea´s educational system is
characterized by a heavy reliance on formal education: in each field, the focus is on
more classical material rather than more recent debates. Too much focus is placed
on conformity and memorization, too little on creativity, i.e. the identification of
new problems and innovative, i.e. unconventional solutions (OECD, 1995b). Higher
education has remained a glaring bottleneck: underinvestment in education has
resulted in a major bottleneck in Korea´s technological learning56.
Probably of even greater importance than a lack of money is an outdated approach to
organization:” an extremely unparticipative educational process with strong
rigidities does not favor creativity and initiative. Most, if not all universities have
deficiencies in establishing a critical mass to become first-rate research institutes
owing to heavy teaching loads, lack of sufficient state-of-the-art equipment, and
inadequate research support.” (Kim Linsu, 1997b, p.27) This has two important
negative consequences: Korea´s low level of higher education has been a major drag
on R&D productivity in Korean firms. Of equal importance is that universities have
not been able to play an incubator role for innovative start-up companies.
In short, as a result of its earlier success, Korea's innovation system is now faced
with new challenges.  It is characterized by a number of structural weaknesses,
which by now have been well identified and extensively debated within both the
government and management circles.  Yet the inertia resulting from previous
success and established power structures appear to cripple Korea's ability to adapt to
the new industrial upgrading requirements.  The search for a new policy doctrine
and new corporate strategies remains constrained by a highly unequal distribution of
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 “The problem of under-investment is most acute at the university level… (As a result), all but a
few universities have remained primarily undergraduate teaching-oriented rather than research-
oriented. “ (Kim Linsu (1997b, p.10))
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economic and political power. We now turn to such structural causes for Korea´s
truncated industrial upgrading.
II.4. Korea´s high-debt -growth model
One particularly disturbing feature of Korea´s development model is a
disproportionately high debt: Korea´s chaebol on average have a debt-equity ratio of
4 to 157; and Korea´s total debts are estimated to be twice as large as its GDP of $
500 billion58. It has been argued that such high debt is a necessary consequence of
successful catching-up ( Veneroso and Wade, 1998). High debt reflects large
savings as well as the huge investments required for rapid capacity and market share
expansion59. It is argued furthermore that  catching-up “… is possible only through
borrowings. Neither equity markets nor corporate retained earnings are feasible
alternatives for mobilizing resources on the required scale. And equity finance is
more expensive than debt finance, because of the need to pay a risk premium.” ( p.3)
Successful catching-up thus requires a  financial system that allows firms to borrow
multiples of their equity: successful catching-up necessitates high debt-equity ratios.
The consequence is a financial system that is highly vulnerable to shocks that
interrupt cash flows or funding sources. State intervention - including financial
regulation - is critical in order to reduce such vulnerability: “… there is… a strong
financial rationale for cooperative, long-term, reciprocal relations between firms,
banks and governments in a system with high savings and high debt/equity ratios.”
(Venerosos and Wade, 1998, p.2) A regulated financial sector is an essential
prerequisite for sustaining the Korean development model. This analysis implies
that the IMF approach with its focus on financial deregulation60 violates an
                                                
57
 Of the top 30 chaebol, ten have a debt-to-equity ratio of more than five-to-one (The Economist,
November 29, 1997, p.24). For 1996, the following debt-equity ratios have been reported by SBC
Warburg Dillon Reed: Samsung ( 473 %), Hyundai ( 453%), LG (378%), and Daewoo ( 316%),
as quoted in the Financial Times, January 22, 1998, p.5. Such figures however may underestimate
the real debt burden: for instance Daewoo Motors, the dominant division of the Daewoo group, at
the end of 1996 reportedly had accumulated debts of Won 4500 billion ($ 18 billion), or nearly
six times equity (quoted in the Financial Times, December 4, 1997).
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 Standard & Poor estimates, as quoted in the  Financial Times, February 3, 1998, p.16.
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 Gerschenkron (1962) remains the classical source on the capital requirements of late
industrialization and the role of banks.
60
 One key element of the IMF´s Asian Rescue Package is financial deregulation: the goal is to make
the financial system operate like the Anglo-Saxon financial system. Apart from closing down
troubled financial institutions and the introduction of Western lending and accounting standards,
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essential stability condition of Korea´s high debt development model: it destroys the
base for close cooperation between banks, firms and the government. The result is
that financial deregulation will intensify rather than solve the current crisis.
Financial deregulation is the wrong prescription: “ even if a “western” look-alike
system is established it would not be stable, given the high flow of savings. It would
also sacrifice the very big developmental advantages of a high debt system.” (ibid.,
p.6) In short, the solution proposed by the IMF is part of the problem; it will not
help Korea to solve its most fundamental problem: how to use its huge savings
productively.
This line of argument sounds convincing, in so far as it explains what happened
during the period of catching-up . I agree with the authors` assessment of the
disastrous and largely unrecognised risks of the IMF approach. But their argument
also has two important weaknesses: it fails to explain why debt-equity ratios are
much lower among Taiwanese companies; and it fails to address some negative
consequences of high debt for firm strategies and industrial upgrading.
i) Are high debt-equity ratios really unavoidable?
Let us first look at the question whether high debt-equity ratios are an unavoidable
feature of catching-up. In his earlier important book on “Governing the Market:
Economic Theory and the Role of Governments in East Asian Industrialization”
(1990, page 160), Robert Wade acknowledges that Korea´s corporate debt-equity
ratio has been widely reported to be substantially higher than Taiwan´s ratio61. He
argues however that “…the “true” Korean figure is probably much lower than its
official value because of complications introduced by Korea´s higher inflation rate
and higher permitted rates of accelerated depreciation” (ibid.), quoting a World
                                                                                                                                        
financial deregulation essentially centres on two issues: i) a termination of government
interventions; and ii)  a further opening of the capital account. The first requires the government
to stop intervening in the lending decisions of commercial banks, to eliminate all government-
directed lending, and to give up measures to assist individual corporations avoid bankruptcy,
including subsidized credit and tax privileges. Opening the capital account in turn is the pendant
to trade liberalization: the aim is to foster the free inflow and outflow of capital, both portfolio
capital and direct investment.
61
 Wade ( 1990) quotes figures from Scitovsky (1986: chart 1) showing that, in most years between
1971 and 1980, Korea´s corporate sector debt to equity was between 310 and 380, while Taiwan´s
ratio was much lower between 160 and 180. This is consistent with more recent figures quoted in
Fields (1995: table 4-5) which show that in 1985, the debt-equity ratio of Korean manufacturing
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Bank study on Korea (World Bank 1984, p.238, note 8) that puts the real Korean
figure in the same order of magnitude as Taiwan´s official figure62. Wade
concludes that there is a strong similarity between Taiwan and Korea in that
“financing choices have been weighed heavily in favor of debt rather than equity.”
(Wade, 1990, p.160)
I do not agree with this conclusion. While international comparisons of debt/equity
ratios are certainly plagued by methodological problems, it is not very convincing to
assume that this can explain away huge differences that range from two-to-one (
Scitovsky ( 1986)) to almost three-to-one (Fields (1995)). I would conclude from
these  figures that differences in debt-equity ratios are real and need to be explained
by differences in industrial policies and in the nature of targeted industries in both
countries63. Though Korea and Taiwan share many similarities, the two countries
have chosen very different approaches. An important difference that sets apart
Taiwan´s industrial policies from those pursued in Korea is that directed credit has
played a much less important role, at least until the early 1980s ( Inoue 1993: 14;
Schive 1993: p.14; and San Gee 1995). This can be seen from the high real interest
rates for secured loans that Taiwanese firms had to pay during this period64. This
has changed only since the mid-1980s, when the focus of industrial policy shifted to
industrial upgrading. One should also mention that curb markets have arguably
played a more important role in Taiwan than in Korea as an alternative source of
debt finance relative to bank credit ( Pyung Joo Kim 1994: 284 following ).
Probably of greatest importance however is that, unlike in Korea, Taiwan´s
industrial policy did not discriminate against smaller firms: any firm, irrespective of
size, could participate in industrial promotion programmes, including concessionary
credit. In contrast to the Korean government which used its control of the finance
sector to direct credit to a handful of chaebol, the Taiwanese government did not try
                                                                                                                                        
firms was nearly 350, relative to a ratio of 120 for Taiwan. See also the figures quoted in Patrick
and Park (1994), and in Ranis (1998).
62
 This is ironic, given the fact that the World Bank today stresses Korea´s high debt ratio as one of
the root causes of its crisis.
63
 The following is based on Schive (1993), San Gee (1995). San Gee and Wen-jeng Kuo ( 1998),
and Ernst (1998b).
64
 San Gee ( 1995), table 4. The real interest rates for secured loans in Taiwan were 14.14%, 9.0 %,
8.05% and 9.7% respectively in 1965, 1970, 1975 and 1985. There was only one exception: in
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to promote large national champions65. In this sense, Taiwan´s industrial policy is
focused on flexibility and competition: relatively low entry barriers and non-
discriminatory policies enable small firms to enter targeted sectors and to grow. At
the same time, the legal system puts relatively few obstacles in the way of
bankruptcy (Bee Yan Aw, Xiaomin Chen and Mark J. Roberts (1997)). In other
words, flexibility has two aspects: Taiwan makes it easy for new companies to get
started, and for established ones to fail. Combined, both factors have forced
incumbents to stay trim; they have also accelerated the spread of information, skills
and knowledge.
ii)  Impact on firm strategies
The result is that Taiwan´s smaller companies had to rely more on equity markets
and corporate retained earnings than the chaebol: Taiwanese firms find it more
difficult to raise capital for large-scale volume production and they are under much
greater pressure to submit investment decisions to short-term financial
considerations. In the electronics industry, this has led to very different corporate
strategies from those pursued by the Korean chaebol66. It has forced Taiwanese
firms to respond more quickly to new market opportunities. It has been argued
however that directed credit has given Korean chaebol a substantial long-term
advantage in capital-intensive industries as well as in high-tech industries like
electronics ( Mody ( 1989) and Bloom ( 1992)). Yet, evidence on this matter is
inconclusive. Yoo ( 1990) for instance has found that, despite the credit preference
given to heavy and chemical industries in Korea, the two countries were roughly
equally successful in increasing their export shares to the OECD in heavy and
chemical industries. Directed credit obviously made a difference in “high-tech
                                                                                                                                        
1980, the rate fell to -2.80, which was primarily due to the second oil crisis in that year. Note that
these figures are adjusted for inflationary effects.
65
 After the second world war, the Taiwanese government took over the Japanese enterprises that
had been established during the 50 years of colonial rule (1895-1945).  In contrast to Korea, the
government did not privatize these firms. Instead, they were run as public enterprises.  By
developing a strong public enterprise sector, Taiwan developed companies large enough to enter
the highly capital-intensive production of basic materials, while at the same time avoiding the
dominance of private conglomerates. (San Gee and Wen-jeng Kuo, 1998)
66
 The following is based on Ernst (1998b).
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commodities” like semiconductors and liquid crystal displays.  On the other hand, in
most sectors of the computer industry, Korean chaebol keep lagging well behind
their much smaller Taiwanese competitors, despite their privileged access to
directed credit67.
In short, it is probably misleading to argue that catching-up of necessity requires
high debt-equity ratios. If at all, this claim has a certain plausibility for those sectors
that are characterized by extremely high investment thresholds and risks, and where
the focus primarily is on homogeneous products ( like DRAMs  and advanced
displays). Access to directed credit however is unlikely to make much of a
difference in sectors where quick response to changing markets and technology plus
strong design capabilities are critical (i.e. a variety of sectors of the computer
industry). In those sectors, it may in fact be detrimental in that it constrains speed of
response and flexibility.
In the case of Taiwan, limited access to patient capital appears to have led to a
product specialization that is more complex and sophisticated than in Korea. An
important difference is an overwhelming focus  on computer-related products,
components and  services. Within this sector, Taiwanese firms cover a much
broader range of products than Korea: they are strong not only in design-intensive,
differentiated products but also in homogeneous products. As for the latter , the
main strength of Taiwanese firms is a capacity for quick response to changing
market requirements. Over the last few years, Taiwanese firms have been able to
supplement this with a capacity to coordinate complex international production
networks for leading American and Japanese companies.   At the same time,
successful niche market strategies have been developed for differentiated, design-
intensive hardware products as well knowledge-intensive support services.
For key components, large-scale projects do exist, but they are less dominating for
Taiwan´s electronics industry than in the Korean case. Also, for these projects
Taiwanese firms apparently rely more on joint ventures and partnerships with
foreign firms. Outside of key components, mass production plays a much less
important role than in Korea. As speed of response to changing markets is
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 Ernst (1998b) offers a possible explanation to this puzzle. It is argued that a general reluctance of
the private sector in Taiwan to engage in R&D has been compensated by innovative institutions
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considered to be a major asset, flexible specialization plays an important role for
firm organization and supplier networks. Taiwanese firms normally avoid investing
into leading-edge machinery, preferring well-proven equipment generations that
facilitate quick ramping-up and that reduce uncertainty. Based on mature production
technology, much greater emphasis is placed on quick changes in product design
and organizational innovations related to logistics and global supply chain
management. For instance, Taiwanese firms together with two American market
leaders (Compaq and Dell) today are the pace-setters for the shift to order-based
production systems in the computer industry.
Important differences also exist with regard to market entry: Taiwanese firms
normally prefer a gradual step-by-step approach which is conducive for cumulative
learning. Taiwanese firms consistently avoid vertical integration, and prefer instead
to rely on complex international production networks. A lack of vertical integration
is perceived to have substantial advantages. The fact that key components and
engineering talent have to be purchased on the open market is perceived to enhance
a firm´s flexibility if the technology changes rapidly. In such a case, a heavy reliance
on internal sourcing would obstruct the firm´s capacity for quick response: its
products would loose out to competing products that are able to design-in the latest
generation of high-performance components; and the firm could end up with
obsolete and undifferentiated skills68.
Compare this with the very different approaches pursued by the chaebol: strategic
considerations rather than profitability determine investment decisions and timing
and sequencing of entry strategies, especially for key components ( like DRAMs and
advanced displays). One is to reduce dependence on foreign component sources,
especially from Japan; another is to broaden the scope for diversification through
vertical integration. While both motivations sound plausible, they should not be
taken at face value. A heavy reliance on foreign component sources may not always
be a disadvantage. Take the example of advanced displays, where Korean producers
heavily depend on Japanese suppliers, but, nevertheless, “… were not so worried
                                                                                                                                        
and various support policies for R&D and training, as well as by the early integration of taiwanese
firms into international production networks.
68
 This is in line with the “externalisation” argument proposed by the evolutionary theory of the firm
(see Langlois 1992; and Langlois and Robertson 1995)
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about dependence on Japanese suppliers and … had mostly good experiences in
working with Japanese companies.” (Linden et al, 1997, p.26)69. There is also
strong evidence that intended downstream integration effects have not materialized.
Take for  instance Samsung´s claim that its huge investments into the production of
advanced displays is justified by improving the position of AST Research, an ailing
American PC producer that Samsung had purchased in 1996. While Samsung
invested substantial amounts in AST, this strategy today is in shambles, as AST
keeps rapidly losing market share and has now become a marginal player70.
Easy access to patient debt capital also explains a strong preference of the chaebol
for vertical integration: it is perceived to have a number of important  advantages for
the procurement of key components and for the availability of skills, as well as for
technological learning. For procurement, vertical integration helps to reduce the
threat of periodic supply shortages; it provides a differentiation advantage through
access to internally developed high-performance components; and it can strengthen
the position of  downstream divisions that are users of these components. For skills,
vertical integration implies that each chaebol covers an extremely broad range of
activities and can re-assign engineers with the necessary skills  based on the
strategic objectives of the group. As a variety of skills can be developed within the
chaebol, this allows for an internalization of technological learning. Furthermore,
vertical integration is expected to have a systemic effect on the reduction of
technology gaps, especially for key components that are sensitive to learning
economies71 .
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 A heavy reliance on component imports however becomes a serious problem, when devaluation of
the local currency leads to drastic price increases.
70
 Another example of unrealized downstream integration efforts is  LG´s “strategic alliance” with
DEC to supply advanced displays for jointly developed notebooks that would be marketed by
DEC (“LG to Export Notebooks to DEC on OEM Basis”,  Korea Herald, August 20, 1997)
71
 A typical claim for instance is  that early entry into DRAM production of one division has
facilitated a chaebol`s later entry into advanced displays. (Asia IT Report, “South Korea´s
Monitor Industry in 1996”, Market Intelligence Center, Institute for Information Industry, Taipei,
September 1997.)
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iii) Negative implications for industrial upgrading
Korea´s development model has been predicated on high and growing high debt-
equity ratios. While it has produced extremely positive results in terms of rapid
catching-up, it now has ceased to be a realistic option, simply because such high
debt has become unsustainable. A brief comparison with the very different
development pattern in Taiwan has shown that successful catching-up may also be
possible without high debt. This of course does not imply that Korea should try to
imitate Taiwan´s development model. What it does imply however is that a return to
and a consolidation of Korea´s traditional high debt growth model is neither
necessary nor feasible72. In my view, Venerosos and Wade (1998) unnecessarily
reduce the options open to Korea to a much too narrow dichotomy. The issue is not
simply whether Korea and other Asian countries should “ give up developmental
advantages of a high debt system in return for lower risks of financial crashes.”( p.8)
The real issue is: What changes are necessary in the development model that has
been successful for a certain period of time, but now has blocked a further industrial
upgrading?
If one chooses such an optic, one will find that the link between growth and debt is
not cast in iron: change is possible and in fact unavoidable and requires a
paradigm shift in the development model. Industrial upgrading essentially implies
that a country can improve its capacity to use its savings productively.
Accumulation of capital matters, but it needs to be complemented with something
more qualitative: a capacity to learn and innovate 73. Research in OECD countries
has shown that the capability to learn determines the economic success, not only of
firms and industries, but also of whole regions (industrial districts) and countries
(OECD, 1996a, 1996b and 1996c )74. Combining the requirements of both
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 Implications for Korea´s strategic options are discussed in part III..
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 This is in line with the findings of growth and innovation theorists who, while using different
terminologies, all argue that investment needs to be complemented by learning and the formation
of capabilities, in order to achieve sustained development. Important sources are: Schumpeter
(1912); Avramovitz ( 1989), Freeman ( 1987), Lundvall ( 1992), Nelson (1992), Bell and Pavitt
(1993) and Nelson and Pack (1995). This of course implies that accumulation theorists (Young ,
1993; Kim and Lau, 1994; and Krugman,1994), for whom growth is largely a result of “a rapid
movement along prevailing production functions” (Krugman (1994)), are taking a much too
narrow view.
74
 This has given rise to the concept of the “learning economy” which argues that learning is an
interactive, socially embedded process and that  its efficiency crucially depends on the
48
accumulation and learning is a major challenge: it requires a set of institutions,
incentives and policies that can mobilize huge savings and put them to productive
use, while at the same time promoting a domestic knowledge base that is broad
enough to facilitate industrial upgrading.
We have seen that, while Korea´s traditional development model was conducive for
the needs of catching-up, i.e. rapid capacity and market share expansion, it has
failed to develop a broad domestic knowledge base that is essential for industrial
upgrading. We have also seen evidence of the resulting sticky pattern of
specialization. Truncated industrial upgrading implies a precarious capacity to use
savings productively. This is one of the dark sides of the Korean model75 which has
been neglected for far too long by scholars ( like myself) who otherwise were right
in defending some of its historical achievements against neoclassical orthodoxy.
There is ample evidence that Korea´s system of state-led development has given rise
to a substantial wastage of capital. One general indicator that there is a problem is
the marginal capital output ratio, a proxy for measuring the productivity of capital:
“With an average annual savings rate of 30 percent and an average annual increase
in the national income of 8 percent,…(Korea´s)…marginal capital output ratio has
been in the range of four to five – not especially low when compared with other
developing countries. … The implication is that the growth achievement could have
been even more impressive if the resources of a disciplined labor force and a large
increase in new plants and equipment had been combined more efficiently.” (Aliber,
1994, p.342)
Badly implemented financial regulation that avoids public control has a built-in
tendency toward over-lending and over-production. The basic mechanism is well
documented in Kim Pyung Joo´s study of the development of Korea´s financial
institutions ( 1994). Government-controlled finance has prevented the banking
sector from from playing a competent coordinating role: “… banks´ profits have
been illusory and frequently manipulated by the payment of interest on reserve
deposits with the central bank” ( ibid, p.292). Its raison d´etre has been to channel
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financial resources to a handful of chaebol. The primary objective has been growth
(or sales) maximization rather than profitability. “The goal was for enterprises to
grow at top speed to achieve a critical minimum size, at which the government
would be unable to allow insolvency or bankruptcy. … Fuel for the rapid expansion
of firms was provided by high leverage or heavy dependence on debt financing.
Firms raced to the brink of bankruptcy with one eye ever fixed on the government,
which played the role of referee in this game of brinkmanship. It exercised
discretionary power for determining which firm would get the benefit of financial
credit and thus be saved from going over the edge. Thus, the maintenance of a good
relationship with the government was the most crucial element for success in
business. … A natural and inevitable consequence … was the increase in insolvent
firms or non-performing assets on the balance sheets of the banks.” (ibid., pages 283
and 284)
The result has been a persistent tendency towards over-capacity in major growth
industries such as ship-building, automobiles and semiconductors76. Directed credit
is also prone to periodic waves of land speculation: “bank credit was extended
normally on the basis of client firms´ real estate collateral instead of their credit
standing, which tended to bring into motion a cumulative process of bank loans
utilized for the acquisition of more real estate, which in turn led to further bank
credit next round.” (Kim Pyung Joo, (1994), p.284) This has led to a “bubble
economy” effect similar to the one that has hit Japan earlier on. Leading chaebol
have played a major role in such unproductive use of capital. Take for instance the
Samsung group. In 1996, Samsung´s debt equity ration was reported as 473%77. In
a statement prepared to counter the request of the incoming administration of
president-elect Kim Dae Jung that the chaebol should rationalize their assets,
Samsung said that it would reduce its debt to 150% of its equity in part through
sales of real estate valued at about $ 300 million, plus the cancellation of plans to
build a 102-story headquarters building in a posh area in southern Seoul, valued at
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about three trillion won ($ 1.83 billion), although it will not sell the massive plot of
land78.
In short, it is possible to argue that a substantial share of savings has not been used
productively. Government pressure and guarantees, combined with poor regulations
have led to distorted investment decisions, encouraging banks to finance risky
projects in the expectation that they would enjoy the profits, if any, while the
government would cover serious losses. This of necessity leads to over-investment,
and the price of assets that are in limited supply, such as land and skills, will rise
excessively. This bubble persists as long as the government guarantee is credibly
maintained. The first bank that fails gets bailed out, but the costs of bail-out keep
rising with each new bail-out, which reduces the government´s capacity to provide
future rescues. Sooner or later, this will invite speculative attacks on the domestic
currency (as demonstrated by Krugman, (1998)).
II.5. An unbalanced industry structure
Let us now turn to a second cause of truncated upgrading: Korea´s extremely
unbalanced industry structure. A distinguishing feature of the Korean model is a
dominance of large business groups that is unrivalled  by other counties79: the
combined sales of the five largest chaebol as a share of GNP grew from 12.8% in
1975 to 35% in 1980 and to a mind-boggling 52.4% in 1984 (Kim Linsu (1993),
p.2). The chaebol dominate sales and exports; they can recruit the best workers,
technicians, engineers and managers; they have privileged access to investment
capital; and their strategies determine the product mix and the capabilities of
Korea´s industry.
In the electronics industry, one important difference that distinguishes Korea´s
approach from the Japanese model is the extreme degree of concentration which is
much higher than in Japan (Kohama and Urata:1993, 152).  Korea's electronics
industry is controlled by four companies -- Samsung, LG, Hyundai and Daewoo. In
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1988, 56 per cent of the country's electronics production came from these four
groups, with the first two alone accounting for 46 per cent of production
(Bloom:1992, p. 12). The figures are even more remarkable on an item-by-item
basis with Samsung, Lucky-Goldstar and Daewoo accounting for 100 per cent of the
VCRs, microwave ovens, refrigerators and washing machines and 82.2 per cent of
the CTVs produced locally (Bark:1991, 32).80
Sellers' concentration ratios in the domestic market are even higher: until the early
1990s, Samsung, Goldstar and Daewoo had control over roughly 70 per cent of the
Korean market (Jun Yong Wook and Kim Sang Goh (1990).  For CTVs, VCRs,
microwave ovens, refrigerators and washing machines, the Big Three's domestic
market share came close to 100 per cent. Due to the gradual liberalization of the
domestic market for consumer goods and industrial electronics, this tight control of
the domestic market is now beginning to erode. Yet while the chaebol may lose
control over final product markets, their dominant position in components, and
especially DRAM memories, may last much longer. In 1992 for instance, the total
semiconductor and electronics sale of one company alone, Samsung Electronics,
accounted for 20 per cent of the Korean electronics industry's exports.81 None of
the big electronics groups in Japan comes close to such an overwhelming position of
dominance. In short, the Korean electronics industry retains a structure which,
according to textbook wisdom, is no longer supposed to exist: a tight national
oligopoly controls both domestic production and the domestic market.
i) Implications for corporate strategy: “octopus-like diversification”
Korea´s unbalanced industry structure has given rise to a peculiar form of
competition strategy that focuses on incessant product diversification, often into
technologically unrelated areas82.  Each time a chaebol has reached the limits of
"easy" capacity and market share expansion for a particular product, it moved on to
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a new product group that promises rapid market expansion. In Korea, such
“opctopus-like diversification has been pushed to the extreme: the top five chaebol
are in an average of 140 different sectors each. No other country, not even Japan and
Sweden, comes close to such an extreme reliance on unrelated diversification.
Here lies one of the most important differences between chaebol--type business
strategies and those pursued by the Japanese electronics firms, which typically have
been reluctant to engage in product diversification. A survey of the 200 largest
Japanese industrial firms undertaken by Fruin (1992, p. 318)  shows that only 40 per
cent of them engaged in a limited amount of diversification, with 41 per cent of new
goods being in the same two-digit SIC category as the firm's established products83.
Gerlach (1993) has also shown that Japanese diversification has predominantly
resulted in the "spinning-off" of new subsidiaries that retain a certain degree of
decision autonomy from the parent company. At least for the electronics industry,
there are grounds for challenging Amsden's claim that constant "... diversification
into many technologically unrelated mature product markets was one of the essential
"pillars" of Korea's successful late industrialization and that, in doing so, it was
dutifully following the earlier Japanese example" (Amsden (1993), pages 17 and
18).
“Octopus-like” diversification has had important negative implications for
capability formation. Rather than deepening their involvement in a particular sector
or group of related products, the chaebol have typically used diversification as a
short-cut to rapid market share expansion, without much concern for the depth of
the production system that can be generated by such shallow forms of
diversification. This "octopus--like" diversification has made it very difficult for
most Korean companies to accumulate systematically a broad range of technological
capabilities for a given set of products. It also has also left very little scope for an
upgrading into higher-end market niches where perium prices could be reaped - a
strategy perfected by Taiwanese firms. Finally, this opportunistic form of unrelated
diversification has precluded a shift to technology diversification. Defined as “ the
expansion of a company´s or a product´s technology base into a broader range of
                                                
83
 The latter figure would in fact be higher  -- 46 per cent  -- if the United States SIC code did not
classify computers in a different category (35) from other electrical devices (36 and 38).
53
technology areas” (Granstrand (1992, p.291), technology diversification is an
attempt to reap technology-related economies of scope. It is arguably Korea´s best
bet to proceed with industrial upgrading84.
ii) A dearth of innovative small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
The pervasive role that the chaebol have played as engines of growth and industrial
transformation sets Korea apart from Taiwan, where small-and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) have been the main carriers of industrial development. Among
Asian countries, Taiwan probably has made most progress towards a balanced
industry structure that allows for close and flexible interaction between large
business groups and SMEs: this has enabled small firms to grow and to respond
quickly to changes in international markets and technology85; it may also explain
why Taiwan has been able to shield itself much better than Korea from the financial
melt-down that has swept through much of Asia.
Contrast this with the situation in Korea, where directed credit has consistently
focused on the development of large domestic conglomerates. This has prevented
the development of a vibrant domestic SME sector: until very recently, small,
innovative start-up companies had little chances to gain access to such credit. In his
important book on the dynamics of Korea´s technological learning, Kim Linsu
argues (Kim Linsu, 1997a, pages 6 and 10): "The most serious consequence of the
asymmetric promotion of chaebol was the impediment to the healthy growth of
SMEs." "The government ... has been so preoccupied with mission-oriented projects
( that were meant to create national champions, DE) that it failed to develop an
effective infrastructure for SME promotion."86
The lack of a vibrant domestic network of SMEs has important negative
consequences for learning and specialization. A key issue is whether a firm succeeds
to move beyond imitation based on reverse engineering and moves on to apprentice-
type learning where a link with a foreign company provides access to both tacit and
explicit knowledge (Kim Linsu (1997a, pages 208 and 209). This distinction allows
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us to highlight an important difference in technological learning between South
Korea and Taiwan. In Korea, most SMEs continue to remain stuck with a focus on
imitation based on reverse engineering (Kim Linsu (1997a), chapters 8 and 9). This
has led to a very low learning efficiency of SMEs in Korea. The situation is radically
different in Taiwan (Ernst (1998b)): especially in the computer industry, SMEs have
been exposed early on to apprentice-type learning arrangements with large firms (
both foreign and domestic) which has enabled them to move on rapidly from
relatively simple to increasingly complex forms of international subcontracting.
The chaebol's dominance in the electronics industry also has had a negative effect
on the role of SMEs engaged in the supply of parts and components and other
complementary support activities. Although formally independent, most of them are
tightly integrated into the production networks of one of the four major chaebol.
Until the early 1980s, this had resulted in an industry structure where the leading
chaebol tended to produce almost everything in-house, from electronics components
and electrical accessories to transistors, semiconductors and precision engineering
parts (Wong Poh Kam:1991, 53). Since then, they have been forced to increase their
reliance on domestic subcontractors for two main reasons. In response to the
proliferation of labour disputes since the famous wave of strikes in June 1987, the
chaebol have shifted the burden of increasing labour costs onto the shoulders of
formally independent domestic suppliers. At the same time, the growing
sophistication of Korea's electronics production has increased the demand for local
support industries and services. With intensifying price competition, the chaebol are
now more willing to outsource some of these activities. One peculiar feature of the
Korean electronics industry is that subcontractors work only for one manufacturer
and are thus locked into a fairly closed production network controlled by a particular
chaebol. Small- and medium-sized suppliers have very limited decision-making
autonomy, which significantly limits any attempts to improve their international
competitiveness.
An equally important concern is the extreme concentration of private R&D. It is
estimated that the five leading chaebol currently account for nearly 37% of Korea´s
total R&D investment in the private sector; the ten leading chaebol for nearly 45%;
and the twenty leading chaebol for more than 53% (Oki, Toshie (1993), p.46) The
same study found that in the U.S. and Japan the share of the 20 leading firms in total
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R&D investment was less than 31% and less than 37%. There is no doubt that
chaebol control the key assets and capabilities of Korea’s innovation system. The
result is that science and technology decisions continue to be overwhelmingly
shaped by the strategies of the leading chaebol. This obviously puts Korean SMEs at
a major disadvantage, and thus perpetuates Korea´s extremely unbalanced industry
structure. Take, for instance, access to human resources. The leading scientists and
engineers recruited for the chaebol’s R&D centers and technology planning posts
with but few exceptions are all foreign-educated PhDs often with extensive
experience at major multinationals in the United States and Japan. This provides the
chaebol with invaluable informal linkages with the major innovation clusters in the
electronics industry. SMEs do not have any realístic chance to hire such people.
This is another area which distinguishes Korea from Taiwan.
In recent years, the government has started to give greater attention to the promotion
of SMEs capable of developing their own component designs. This has led to a
variety of new policy instruments designed to improve the competitive conditions
for innovative start-up companies.87 Most observers agree that such policies have
had only limited success. A recent survey by the School of Small Business at
Soongsil University indicates that 70 per cent of government-allocated credit goes to
a few relatively large SMEs with strong ties with the leading chaebol through
subcontracting arrangements 88 . One particularly ironic finding is that many of
these small businesses are becoming "mini-chaebol" by branching into various
businesses but keeping each of the companies small to maintain access to cheap
credit.
The independent SME sector will probably remain weak and vulnerable for some
time to come.  This sets Korea apart from the Japanese production system with its
sophisticated multi-tier supplier networks, where small companies can be found at
all levels with sound design and engineering capabilities for components and
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materials.89 This lack of a strong domestic supplier network of SMEs also marks a
major difference with Taiwan, where highly flexible domestic subcontracting
networks based on SMEs have played a crucial role in the development of
Taiwanese electronics exports (Ernst, 1998b).
Squeezed in between the chaebol and the myriad of SMEs are a handful of
independent, medium-sized second-tier firms, each of which is basically organized
again as a mini-chaebol. Typical examples of these second-tier firms include the
Anam group, with Anam Industrial as its flagship company, and Trigem Computer.
In an industry dominated by chaebol with their privileged access to government
bureaucrats, both companies are able to survive only by identifying smaller, but
lucrative niche markets that the chaebol have neglected. An additional prerequisite,
it seems, has been a long-term relationship with a foreign company: Trigem
Computer through its joint venture with Seiko Epson, and Anam through its link
with its United States marketing affiliate, Amkor, the original founding company of
Anam Industrial.
While Japan's electronics industry includes a number of originally small- or
medium-sized, highly innovative start-up companies like Sony, Kyocera, Canon,
Minebea or Uniden, the tight oligopoly governing the Korean electronics industry
has made this almost impossible. A telling example of the constant frustration that
innovative start-up companies encounter is that of a small computer design
company, run by a group of eight engineers and computer scientists who knew each
other since high school and who no longer wished to work in the highly regimented
environment of the chaebol. After trying, without success, to sell some of their
designs for pen and pocket computers to the chaebol, they ended up selling them to
a second-tier Taiwanese PC assembler which, at least for a few months, is reported
to have made healthy profits with these machines (Author's interviews, Korea,
November 1993).
To conclude, a dearth of innovative and aggressive SMEs has severely constrained
Korea´s attempts to develop higher-end niche markets, one important element of
industrial upgrading. This again differs markedly from the situation in Taiwan,
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where SMEs have played an active role in developing such strategies. This also sets
Korea apart from Japan where SMEs have played an important role in the
development of the electronics industry. There is of course no doubt that the
strength of the chaebol historically has been an important asset: a capacity to reap
economies of scale and scope, combined with substantial cross-subsidization has
facilitated rapid catching-up. But it fails to cope with the increasingly complex
requirements of industrial upgrading. The strength of the chaebol however has
turned into a burden simply because Korea today lacks a viable SME sector that can
provide key components and critical complementary support services to the chaebol.
The issue is not to get rid of the chaebol, but how to transform them, while at the
same time developing a viable SME sector.
III. Options for Strategic Response: What Changes are Necessary in the
Korean Model?
III.1. The vicious circle of truncated industrial upgrading
Our analysis of the evolution of technological learning in Korea´s electronics
industry has highlighted some of the strengths and weaknesses of the Korean
development model. We have seen how an exposure to high debt-equity ratios,
combined with an extremely unbalanced industry structure, have led to a sticky
pattern of specialization and a narrow domestic knowledge base. It is this vicious
circle of truncated industrial upgrading that explains the extreme vulnerability of
Korea to Asia´s financial crisis. The melt-down of Asian currencies and the turmoil
in international financial markets have acted as a catalyst and determined the timing
of the outbreak of the Korean crisis. Yet, it is due to the above structural weaknesses
that these external factors had such a devastating effect.
It is important to remember that Korea already had serious problems before traders
abandoned its currency. Since 1996, a reduction in export revenues combined with
depressed domestic sales has led to a liquidity squeeze and bankruptcies of major
chaebol. Large-scale strikes sparked by the government´s controversial attempts to
push through legislation on labor law reforms have eroded social consensus. The
result has been a massive reduction of domestic investment and consumer
expenditures. In other words, Korea´s was already caught in a deflationary spiral,
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and hence was already weakened when the financial crisis hit. A survey of the
Korean economy, published well before the financial crisis, states unequivocally:
“The South Korean economy is heading for a crisis as the growth that sustained the
country´s outward-oriented expansion over the past three decades is beginning to
run out of steam.”90 In 1997, truncated upgrading produced a record “corporate
meltdown”: 13,791 firms went bankrupt, most of them before the bursting of the
Korea bubble. Among these firms are eight large chaebol, which sought bankruptcy-
court protection with combined debts of 20 trillion Won ( $21 billion)91.
We have seen that the Korean model that was tremendously successful during the
catching-up phase, has now reached its limits for two reasons: it generates
unsustainable high debt-equity ratios, and it is out of touch with current industrial
upgrading requirements. In part II of this paper, I have argued that attempts to return
to the status quo ante will not provide a solution. Nor will the IMF approach. Since
1993, Korea has experienced a series of poorly designed and implemented
liberalization policies that arguably have further aggravated some of Korea´s most
serious structural deficiencies92: there is a lack of clear and enforceable rules; banks
have been given much greater freedom to borrow overseas, which has dramatically
deterioriated the maturity structure of Korea´s debt93; and traditional rules-based
state-business relationships have degenerated into a Korean-style “cronyism”.
These developments culminated during the summer of 1997, with the liquidity crisis
of the Kia group, Korea´s third largest car producer and Korea´s eighth-largest
chaebol. Bad management of the Kia crisis arguably has broken the confidence of
international capital and currency markets in the Korean model. In response to Kia`s
liquidity crisis, the government vacillated and dithered. A statement by the Ministry
of Finance which refused to confirm an automatic bail-out was interpreted by the
financial markets as an important coded message that from now on earlier bail-out
                                                
90
  “Focus. South Korea: Trade and Investment”, Far Eastern Economic Review, October 23, 1997,
p.70.
91
 The Economist, January 24, 1998, p. 81.
92
 The following is based on Chang Ha-Joon, 1998a and 1998b. Chang shows how poorly designed
and implemented liberalization policies since 1993 have created a vaccum that has magnified the
traditional weaknesses of the Korean model.
93
 The share of short-term debt has been rapidly increasing from  43% in 1993 to 58.2% in 1996,
and 58.0% in 1997. This is much higher than the non-OECD countries average  of 20%.
59
guarantees would no longer hold. This is ironic, as the real motivation of this
statement had to do with party politics. The demise of Kia was seen to improve the
chances of Samsung to enter car manufacturing. This was in the interest of the
government for two reasons: Samsung had developed close links with the Kim
Young Sam administration; and it had agreed to locate its plant in the home
province of the president, in Pusan. A traditional “pork barrel” deal thus was
misinterpreted as a signal for radical liberalization. Given the turmoil in Asian
currency markets, this had devastating effects on foreign investors.
In short, ill-conceived and mismanaged liberalization has accentuated some of
Korea´s most serious structural deficiencies. This implies that attempts to return to
the status quo ante will not provide a solution; nor will the IMF approach with its
focus on deregulation. Korea can no longer afford to muddle through in a state of
truncated upgrading, even once the current financial crisis will have subsided. This
has important policy implications. While drastic changes in the financial system are
important, they need to be supplemented with changes in the real economy:
industrial upgrading is overdue, and this requires fundamental changes in the
Korean model. A new round of policy and institutional innovations is required that
can help to remove the barriers to industrial upgrading.
There were ample opportunities for such upgrading during the period of the high
Yen. The fact is that, despite much talk, these opportunities have not been used. The
tragedy is that the window of opportunity for making this move may now have been
closed for a long time by the current debt and financial crisis. The IMF package
unnecessarily increases such barriers to industrial upgrading. A radical break is
required in the Korean development model: Korea now needs to move beyond a
focus on quantitative development towards  multi-faceted qualitative development
which necessitates a broadening of the domestic knowledge base. A new round of
policy and institutional innovations is required that can help to remove the barriers
to industrial upgrading.
III.2. New competitive challenges
How important these upgrading requirements are can be seen when we look at some
major changes in the competitive requirements that Korea´s electronics industry is
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facing today. Probably the most immediate challenge is the decline of Korea´s
market share in its major export markets in the U.S., Europe and Japan. To a large
degree, this results from Korea´s sticky specialization on price-sensitive lower- end
consumer devices and standard components, like DRAMs. Furthermore, new
competitive challenges are now confronting Korea´s electronics industry, both from
below and from above. From below, new, lower-cost competitors have emerged in
China and Southeast Asia for consumer electronics as well as standard components;
these new competitors include both offshore transplants of Japanese, American,
Taiwanese and European firms as well as local firms. From above, established
market leaders, especially for key components, are more and more reluctant to
license technology to Korean firms: the closer Korean firms have moved to the
technology frontier, the more constraints they face in their access to foreign
technology94.
A third important new challenge is that Korea´s electronics industry will face
increasingly intense competition in its home market, as WTO-driven liberalization
will proceed. Korea is now a member of the OECD, with the result that such
liberalization pressures are bound to increase. This is of great importance, as high
prices in the domestic market traditionally have enabled Korean firms to cross-
subsidize their aggressive export pricing strategies. Furthermore, the domestic
market traditionally has acted as a buffer against disruptions in export market
growth: until recently, Korea´s domestic market has typically accounted for around
40% of all consumer electronics sales of Korean firms.
Finally, and by far of greatest importance are some fundamental changes in the
nature of competition in the electronics industry95. Competition has globalized and
become more knowledge-based, making it more difficult for firms to identify market
niches and to grow with them. Competition centers around global standards that are
set by a handful of powerful global market leaders, like Intel and Microsoft, giving
rise to global oligopolies. Simultaneously, powerful forces have increased market
volatility: there has been a dramatic increase in the pace of change and uncertainty
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related to technology and markets, with the result that competitive success is
determined by the speed of response to such changes. Intense price competition
needs to be combined with product differentiation, in a situation where continuous
price wars erode profit margins. Of critical importance however is speed-to-market:
getting the right product to the highest volume segment of the market right on time
can provide huge profits. Being late is a disaster which quite frequently may force a
company out of business96. As a result, competition today centers around a firm´s
ability to build capabilities quicker and at less cost than its competitors (Kogut and
Zander, (1993)).
Korean firms can no longer focus exclusively on price competition, but must
simultaneously match best practice in quality,  product innovation and speed-to-
market. Under these competitive conditions, the static comparative advantage on
which Korean firms have based their export success erodes more rapidly. It is clear
that the chaebol´s hierarchical organization and top-down management approaches
are ill-equipped to cope with these challenges: major changes are required in firm
organization and industry structure in order to accelerate speed-to-market and in
order to improve the capacity for flexible response to changing markets.
III.3. The limits to “muddling-through”
The financial crisis has dramatically reduced the access of Korean firms to patient
debt capital. A return to the high-debt growth model clearly is no longer a realistic
option. Nor is it very realistic to hope that exporting one´s way out of the crisis will
be possible.  “Muddling-through” has run its course.
Until around mid-1996, “muddling-through” did produce some remarkably positive
results, basically for three reasons97: Of over-riding importance has been the
substantial appreciation of the yen relative to the U.S. dollar, as a result of which the
price competitiveness of Korean electronics products experienced an unexpected
improvement.  With the won’s fall against the yen, Korean electronics firms were
enjoying an export boom and taking business from Japanese competitors,
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particularly in price-sensitive market segments like DRAMs and lower-end
consumer devices. A second important factor behind the relative success of
muddling-through has been the cyclical boom of DRAM exports since 1993.  In
1996, this boom however gave way to a severe bust, which ruthlessly exposed some
of the fundamental structural weaknesses of this industry that I have discussed
before. It clearly demonstrated that the Korean overdependence on DRAMs can be
fatal, as this is the “bleeding-edge” of the semiconductor industry.
China has been a third and final reason for the attractiveness of muddling-through:
since 1992 the floodgates to its huge market have been pushed wide open.  Korean
electronics companies with their focus on cheap household goods and audio-visual
equipment were obviously able to reap substantial windfall profits from this new
“China boom.”  Yet soon this easy phase of penetrating the Chinese market through
direct exports came to an end, as the central government has  clamped down on
imports. Korean companies have felt the brunt of this import reduction, as their
sales overwhelmingly depended on exports98.
III.4. From Catching-up to Technology Diversification
This poses a major dilemma for the Korean electronics industry.  How to upgrade its
competitive position through improved product differentiation and market
development capabilities, without losing its traditional strengths, i.e., the formidable
mass production capabilities resulting from superior size and oligopolistic market
control? In what follows, I will briefly sketch out one possible option for strategic
response to the current crisis which, in my view, has received insufficient attention:
an upgrading from product to technology diversification that broadens Korea´s
knowledge base, but at the same time utilizes its traditional strengths99.
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the benefits of China´s  import substitution have been  reaped by leading Japanese consumer
electronics firms which, since 1992, have rushed to expand their Chinese transplant production
activities ( For details, see Ernst 1997a). The same is true for Taiwanese firms, and a few
American companies in the computer industry.
99
 Another option, chosen in particular by Taiwanese firms, would be to pursue a number of indirect
entry strategies which focus on niche markets related to specialized needs and capabilities. It is
however unrealistic to expect that Korea can successfully replicate such a strategy. The main
reason are some peculiar features of Taiwan´s industry structure which, we have seen, are
blatantly absent in the case of Korea. One is an extreme form of specialization of Taiwan´s
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As Korean firms are approaching the limits of catching up, it is necessary to search
for new approaches. The international environment in the 1990s is not nearly as
welcoming to latecomers as that of the 1970s and early 1980s. In contrast to their
Japanese, American and European counterparts, a medium-sized country like Korea,
which only recently joined the international market, is less well-endowed to cope
with the restrictions imposed on international trade, investment and technology
flows due to the proliferation of “high-tech neo-mercantilism” (Ernst and O’Connor
[1989], p.26 passim).  As a result, head-on competition with market leaders in
“high-end applications” is out of the question.
Rather than jumping right into "technological leadership" strategies, recent research
has shown that industrial latecomers may have an intermediate option, i.e.,
technology diversification. Defined as “ the expansion of a company´s or a product´s
technology base into a broader range of technology areas” (Granstrand (1992,
p.291), such strategies are an attempt to reap technology-related economies of
scope. Technology diversification differs quite substantially from so-called
“technology leadership” strategies which are defined by their focus on products with
a high R&D content (i.e., high R&D intensity or high R&D value-added). Instead,
technology diversification focuses on products which are "... based on several...
crucial technologies which do not have to be new to the world or difficult to
acquire" (Granstrand ( 1992), p. 300). Empirical research on Japanese, U.S. and
Swedish companies has demonstrated the relevance of this strategy: it has shown
that "...technological coexistence is more predominant than technological
substitution, as seen from the larger number of old technologies in a current product
generation, compared to the number of obsolete technologies (Granstrand (1992), p.
305.).
Japanese firms have played a pioneering role in the development of technology
diversification strategies.  The underlying rationale has been threefold: an attempt to
compensate for the increasing constraints on their existing manufacturing exports; a
deliberate strategy to develop generic technologies that could form the base for
                                                                                                                                        
domestic supply base; the  second feature is a certain network structure of multiple, volatile and
short-term links that involve only limited financial and technology transfers: Taiwan´s computer
industry is based on extremely open and volatile  production networks, arguably even more so
than the highly flexible production networks that characterize California's Silicon Valley (For
evidence and further sources, see Ernst ( 1998b))
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penetrating future growth markets; and finally, a reaction to the increasing
technological complexity and rising R&D cost of new products (Odagiri and Goto
(1992)). For Korean electronics firms, technology diversification strategies could
have a number of important advantages. It builds on existing strengths of Korea´s
approach to technological learning. As technology diversification normally goes
hand-in-hand with extensive reliance on external technology sourcing, Korean firms
could make use of their accumulated capabilities in external technology sourcing,
imitation and adaptive engineering.  Technology diversification can also reduce the
financial burden and high debt that result from over-ambitious “technology
leadership” strategies. To the extent that their expenditures on R&D will be reduced
by the financial crisis, technology diversification can help Korean firms to reduce
these costs, and to spread them not only over many markets (countries and
segments), but also over many products.  Finally, technology diversification may
also help to open up new windows of opportunity for international market
penetration and for the development of new market niches. Given Korea's limited
capacity to create generic technologies and to develop new products and markets,
any attempt to follow the U.S. focus on "breakthrough" technologies would clearly
be unrealistic, with the possible exception of semiconductor memory products.  In
most cases, Korean electronics firms would be well advised to pursue technology
diversification strategies, which would enable them to build up gradually their
capabilities for product and market development.
III.5. Conclusions
Leading chaebol claim that they have already vigorously moved into this direction.
They point to a series of technology agreements with leading American and
Japanese electronics producers and to a massive increase of R&D expenditures and
productive investment. Since 1993, the four leading Korean electronics producers
have indeed drastically increased their R&D and capital outlays; they were also
planning to increase them even further before the crisis hit100.
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 For evidence, see Ernst (1994 b), chapter 5. Over the last few years, all major chaebol have
poured huge amounts of capital into R&D, with the result that the average ratio of R&D to sales
has increased to 6%. For the Samsung group, that figure has reached 13%. If that figure is
correct, that would be quite impressive: it would imply that Samsung substantially spends more
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What is important however is not the amount of investment expenditures per se, but
their allocation among different types of products and production activities.  The
real question is to what degree such investments have been used to correct some of
the basic weaknesses of the Korean electronics industry that we have discussed
before, especially with regard to product specialization, the organization of
production and the accumulated technological capabilities.  And here the empirical
evidence speaks for itself.  Since 1993, capital spending has been overwhelmingly
concentrated on the rapid expansion of mass production lines for two products, i.e.
computer memories and liquid crystal displays (LCDs). In 1994 for instance,
Samsung has spent an estimated 80% of its investment total of $1.87 billion on just
these two product groups.  The respective ratios for Goldstar and Hyundai were
even higher101.  The huge capital spending binge of Korean electronics firms thus
clearly has had the primary effect of consolidating the existing patterns of product
specialization and production organization.  Only in a very limited way will it be
able to act as a catalyst for the substantial changes that we have argued before have
long been overdue.  In other words, more of the same rather than a shift to new
products and production activities seems to be the common denominator of the most
recent wave of capital spending.
This now needs to change. A radical paradigm shift is overdue, as Korea has
reached the limits of the old export-led industrialization model with its emphasis on
standardized mass production, OEM exporting and a catch-up mentality. Moving
beyond these limits will require a number of fundamental changes in the Korean
development model. This is true for government policies and  industry structure, as
well as for firm organization and strategies. There is an urgent need to redefine the
                                                                                                                                        
on R&D, relative to sales, than for instance Canon which, with a little more than 10% of its
sales revenues spent on R&D, is one of the leaders in Japan. In pure quantitative terms,
Samsung thus is doing well. But there are two important differences: First, while debt is a major
source for Samsung`s  R&D expenditures, Japanese companies like Canon are very conservative
and rely overwhelmingly on reinvested profits (Landers, Peter, “Quality counts. Technical
prowess and global reach keep Japanese giants on top.”, Far Eastern Economic Review,
February 5, 1998). In other words, Samsung´s aggressive expansion of R&D expenditures
comes at a heavy cost: what it may gain in terms of knowledge needs to be weighed against a
substantially greater vulnerability to any crisis in the financial system. Second, in terms of the
efficiency of technology management, there is no doubt that even Samsung, which is widely
credited to be one of the best managed Korean chaebol, lags way behind its major Japanese
competitors.
101
 It is reported that, for LCDs alone, Samsung, LG and Hyundai together had budgeted to spend
roughly $4.5 billion between 1996 and 1998. (Linden et al, 1997)
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role of government interventions102. The issue is not to reduce government
intervention but what type of government intervention is necessary to overcome the
barriers to industrial upgrading. Paradoxically, one particularly disquieting aspect of
the Korean model is the weak role that government funding plays for R&D: whereas
the share of government funding in R&D in Korea has been less than 20% since the
late 1980s, the government`s  share in Taiwan has remained about 50% (compared
with about 30% in Japan and the U.S.). This did not matter, as long as the chaebol
had easy access to patient capital and thus were able to fund rising R&D
expenditures out of debt103. This is no longer the case, with the result that the
chaebol will have to reduce drastically their R&D expenditures. This raises an
important question: Will the government will be able to compensate for this decline
in private R&D, for instance by reducing some of the gross inefficiencies in the
public innovation system that we have discussed earlier?
In order to simply keep up with the new challenges of global competition, Korea
needs to move ahead with industrial upgrading: of critical importance is the creation
of a broad-based and diversified knowledge base for technology diversification,
especially with regard to product design, market development, the production of key
components and the provision of high-end knowledge intensive support services.
Strengthening the financial and technological capabilities of domestic small- and
medium-size enterprises (SMEs) is a third essential element of such a paradigm
shift. Fourth, in order to improve their scope for learning and knowledge creation,
Korea´s chaebol need to open up their hierarchical and centralized governance
structures: an increase in the share of foreign ownership that is likely to result from
the financial crisis, could play an important catalytic role104. Fifth, a selective
liberalization of imports and inward FDI is essential for improving access to generic
                                                
102
 For some thoughtful suggestions, see Chang Ha-Joon ( 1997and 1998a).
103
 Taiwan is in a completely different position. As its small firms were weak in terms of R&D, the
government had to pioneer a number of institutional innovations and also had to play a more
important financial role. While many mistakes have been made, overall  the system has worked
extremely well. There was enough time to learn from earlier mistakes and to establish an
institutional framework and incentives that can generate the knowledge and externalities  that
Taiwanese electronics firms need in order to upgrade their industry (Ernst ( 1998b)).
104
 It is problematic to assume that an increase in foreign ownership of local assets is negative under
all circumstances. After the second world war, Germany has been invaded by American capital:
this has not prevented Germany´s development into a major economic power. Within certain
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technologies and core components as well as for improving access to overseas
markets. This reflects the fact that competition in the electronics industry is shaped
primarily by “strategic games” among the leading companies or coalitions of firms,
which position themselves so as to discourage or dictate the actions and responses
of their competitors( Ernst and O`Connor, 1992, chapters I and II).. Such games are
played on different levels, where cooperation often goes hand in hand with intense
competition. Korea can no longer afford to stay out of such games.
Sixth, probably one of the most critical issues that Korea needs to face in the
coming years is a redefinition of the link between local capability formation and
international linkages105. This is true especially for a knowledge-intensive and
highly globalized industry like electronics where clusters of local capabilities can no
longer exist in isolation: they are rapidly becoming internationalized, either through
acquisitions or through the increasing power of global customers. Leading
multinationals in this industry construct international production networks (IPN), as
they need quick access to lower-cost external capabilities that are complementary to
their own competencies. In order to mobilize and harness these external capabilities,
multinationals are forced to broaden their capability transfer to individual nodes of
their IPN. International technology sourcing based on privileged links with major
American and Japanese market leaders are an essential prerequisite for a continuous
industrial upgrading of Korea´s electronics industry. This has important implications
for government policies and firm strategies: a radical reversal is required in strategic
priorities, away from an almost exclusive focus on the establishment of “national”
institutions and linkages. Localized technological learning matters of course. Yet,
“one should never overlook the opportunities of establishing and utilizing
international linkages made …more feasible by … globalization..” (Chang Sei-
Myung (1998), p.28) Finally, Korean electronics firms need to move beyond export-
led international market penetration and to improve the balance between the location
                                                                                                                                        
limits, foreign ownership in fact can help to accelerate necessary changes in outdated
management approaches and firm organization. (UNCTAD 1995).
105
 The following is based on Ernst (1997c and 1998c). This has also been a consensus position of
an international working group meeting on “Globalization and Industrial Upgrading”,
established by the Social Science Research Council(SSRC), NewYork ( SSRC (1997)).
Participants in the meeting included L. Bruszt; J. Deeks; R. Doner; D. Ernst; G. Gereffi; A.
Glasmeier; E. Hershberg; R. Kaplinsky; J. Katz; Tai Lok-lui; S. Martin; L. Mytelka; T. Ozawa;
A. Parisotto; A. Saxenian; J.Sedaitis; and R. Wade.
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of their markets and production sites by expanding and upgrading their international
production networks in the United States, as well as in Asia and Europe.
The current crisis has established beyond doubt that such changes are overdue. New
and innovative approaches are necessary to government policies and firm strategies
that can help remove the barriers to industrial upgrading. All depends on whether
key actors in government and industry are willing to take the necessary actions
needed to fully make this transition.
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